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621. Is Professional Licensing a Racket? | Freakonomics Radio
Freakonomics Radio Network
55m 16s
Show Introduction & Guest Background
- Steven Dubner announces upcoming Freakonomics Radio live show in Los Angeles February 13th
- Guests: Ari Emanuel (CEO of Endeavor), RJ Cutler (documentary filmmaker)
- Tickets at freakonomics live shows
- Partnership with LAist and Sirius XM
- Rebecca Allensworth introduced as Vanderbilt law professor, author of "The Licensing Racket"
- Teaches contracts and antitrust law
- Spent 4 years embedded in Tennessee licensing system
- Attended many board meetings, interviewed 180+ people across 28 professions
Professional Licensing System Overview
- 20% of American workforce subject to professional licensing
- Around 300 licensed professions in US, regulated by ~2,000 licensing boards
- System sanctioned by state governments, expanding rapidly
- Licensing boards are regulatory bodies that decide:
- Who can enter profession
- Required qualifications
- License revocation/restriction decisions
- Boards mostly composed of profession members working full-time in field
- Take couple days off per year to serve as "moonlight regulators"
- Not truly governmental agencies - more like professional associations with state police power
Historical Evolution of Licensing
- Started with physicians in late 19th century
- Limited to "learned professions" until 1970s
- Straight line increase since then in licensed professions and covered workers
- Driven by prestige and belonging motivations
- Example: Alcohol/drug abuse counselors
- Originally easy license to increase access to care
- Ratcheted up over years to require more hours than becoming physician
- Now takes more internship hours than medical school
Problems with Current System
Self-Dealing and Ineptitude
- Boards combine "most dangerous features of professional association and government agency"
- Have interests/incentives of private club with police power of state
- Medical boards particularly bad at detecting lies, lacking regulatory expertise
- Full-time state employees given no power while volunteer board members make decisions
Disciplinary Failures
- System full of "second, third, and even fifth chances"
- Michael Lagalia case example:
- Used license to deal drugs, caught with illegal drugs at home
- Put on probation, continued trading Suboxone while on probation
- Got license back with essentially same restrictions
- Moved to fraudulent COVID testing for $50/piece
- License only revoked after federal conviction and public pressure
- 80% of physicians working in Louisiana prisons have history of major discipline
- Often for overprescribing, malpractice, sex with patients
- "Fallen professionals" end up treating vulnerable populations (prisons, VA, indigent defense)
Criminal Justice Intersection
- Boards freeze when criminal proceedings involved
- 30 Tennessee professionals arrested for dealing opioids - boards took no immediate action
- Boards cite Fifth Amendment concerns, wait for criminal resolution (1-2 years)
- Criminal judges end up regulating medical practice without expertise
- Even after conviction, boards show excessive "forgiveness"
Barriers to Entry Problems
- Licensing creates high financial and educational barriers
- Affects equality, public health, economy, and "American dream"
- Professional license has replaced home ownership as status symbol
- Particularly impacts people with criminal records
- Example: Dental assistant given hard time about driver's license charges unrelated to job
- Hair styling requires 1,500 hours (more than law school's 1,000 classroom hours)
- English-only written tests exclude non-native speakers
Consumer Protection Failures
- Boards rarely hear complaints from consumers/patients
- Licensing exists because consumers "don't know what they're getting"
- Yet system relies on consumer complaints for enforcement
- Sometimes bad conduct is what customers want (selling opioids)
- Boards act as gatekeepers, dismissing complaints without proper investigation
- Public access to disciplinary records varies by state, often opaque
Economic Impact
- Morris Kleiner research: 10% premium on prices, $250 billion annual consumer cost
- Blair and Chung research: 17-27% reduction in providers per profession
- Licensing boards 10x more likely to pursue unlicensed practice than service quality issues
- Turf wars between professions (nurse practitioners vs. physicians)
- COVID response hampered by licensing restrictions and underfunded processing
Scope Creep and Inappropriate Licensing
- Should eliminate licensing for many professions
- Beauty professions, many housing/trade jobs don't need licensing
- 2/3 of licensed workers in healthcare professions
- Licensed practical nurses, many nursing specialties may not need licenses
- Art therapists now licensed in Tennessee with "zero" fiscal impact
Solutions and Alternatives
Preferred Reforms
- Make licensing "bureaucratic" and truly governmental
- Remove profession members from decision-making roles
- Two approaches:
- Advisory boards to full-time government regulators
- Minority profession representation on boards with patient advocates, academics
- Example: Burial services regulated by bureaucrat vs. funeral directors by board
UK Medical Regulation Model
- Medical Professional Tribunal Service
- Three-person panels: physician, lawyer, third person
- All paid full-time salaries for regulatory work
- No plea bargaining, everything public
- More legislative oversight
- Better outcomes: higher rate of license revocation for serious misconduct
National Licensing Concerns
- Would likely create "race to the bottom" - most onerous requirements
- Professional associations would fight to maintain state-by-state capture
- Interstate practice increases competition, which professions resist
Alternatives to Licensing
- Building codes sufficient for many trades
- Background checks and safety rules for childcare
- Professional associations and market mechanisms (journalism example)
- Babysitters function without licenses despite vulnerability concerns
Political Implications
- Trump/Musk "government efficiency" may mean more self-dealing
- Need capable regulation, not just deregulation
- Bureaucrats with regulatory expertise better than self-interested profession members
- State legislation possible but faces professional association opposition
Personal Impact and Conclusions
- Allensworth hopes book will help people understand licensing system
- Consumers shouldn't assume license equals quality or safety
- Need more empirical research on licensing outcomes
- System currently serves profession interests over public protection
