Initial Planning and Strategic Assessment (June 1949)

• Mao consulted General Su Yu (Third Army commander) about Taiwan invasion challenges
• Chinese Communist Party/PLA planned Taiwan invasion 1949-1950
• Taiwan located 100 miles off Chinese mainland
• Mao viewed Taiwan liberation as final step to end "100 years of turmoil"
• Key challenge: amphibious assault exponentially more difficult than mainland campaigns
• Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces maintained aerial/naval superiority
• Risk: enemy could bombard transport forces, drown troops before landing

Four Preconditions for Taiwan Invasion (August 1949)

• Su Yu's response after 2 months analysis:
  • Army readiness to cross Taiwan Strait
  • Navy capability to transport army across strait
  • Guaranteed air coverage for troop protection
  • Cooperation from defected Nationalist agents/planted Communist spies

Costly Lessons from Failed Island Assaults

• Jinmen Island disaster (4 miles off mainland):
  • PLA ignored red flags, bungled landing
  • Lost 9,000 soldiers - "worst loss of Civil War"
• Dengbu Island failure one week later
• Same tactical errors reinforced need for better preparation

Military Buildup and Soviet Support (1949-1950)

• Invasion timeline pushed to 1-2 years away
• Naval expansion:
  • Started with 25 ships defected from Nationalists (1949)
  • Massive boat building program (large troop transports + small landing craft)
  • Soviet support: $300 million loan for naval transports
  • Seized American/Japanese vessels
• Air force development:
  • Seized 350 planes from Nationalists (many not operational)
  • Stalin sold ~1,000 airplanes (1949-1950)
  • Soviet pilot training delegation
  • Goal: aerial superiority within one year
• Training infrastructure:
  • Naval academy established 1949
  • Multiple flight schools established
  • First pilots/air combat units graduated summer 1950
  • Target: 900 pilots, 400 superior-quality fighters by end 1950

Campaign Escalation and Revised Timeline

• Taiwan campaign reset from 1949 to summer 1951
• Training to begin July 1950
• Campaign scope continuously expanded

Hainan Island Victory and Strategic Complications (May 1950)

• PLA conquered Hainan with 200,000 soldiers
• Nationalist losses: 30,000 of 120,000 troops
• Major success after Jinmen embarrassment
• Strategic setback: Nationalists evacuated 90,000 troops to Taiwan
• Chiang Kai-shek's strategic withdrawal:
  • Evacuated offshore islands (except Jinmen)
  • Moved 120,000 troops from Zhoushan Island to Taiwan
  • Total: 400,000 Nationalist troops on Taiwan + 100,000 more in training

Massive Invasion Plan Revision

• Revised plan: 16 armies for Taiwan invasion
• Over 1 million individual soldiers
• Required nearly 2,000 boats for transport
• Nearly 1/3 of China's total military capabilities mobilized

Korean War Impact and Campaign Suspension (June 1950)

• North Korea invaded South Korea
• US Seventh Fleet entered Taiwan Strait for neutralization
• CCP Central Committee assessment: "change situation increases difficulties... US now standing there... not bad thing because we have not completed preparations"

Nationalist Countermeasures (1950)

• Chiang Kai-shek bombed PLA naval vessels/shipyards
• Targeted 25 defected ships from previous year
• Purged Communist infiltrators/sympathizers on Taiwan
• Combined with US Seventh Fleet presence, warranted campaign reevaluation

PLA Capacity Shortfalls

• Mid-1950 production: 50 combat vessels, 50 landing vehicles, 30 auxiliary vessels (43,000 tons total)
• Nationalist defense: 100,000+ tons capacity
• Required capacity: 760,000+ tons for 2,000-ship, 16-army invasion
• Amphibious operations required tight inter-service cooperation - PLA unprepared

Final Campaign Postponement and Defensive Shift

• Campaign postponed to 1952
• Korean War escalation triggered Chinese entry
• Mao moved bulk of PLA north to Korean border
• Remaining troops switched from offensive to defensive posture
• Prepared for potential Chiang Kai-shek reinvasion of mainland