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Europe’s Lost Decades in Semiconductors

Asianometry

16m 26s

European Semiconductor Market Position in 1980s

  • 1980: European producers held only 13% world semiconductor market share
  • 1981-1985: Market share declined to 10%
  • 1985: Europe's biggest semiconductor producer Phillips ranked 10th globally
    • Two-thirds of Phillips production came from American subsidiary Signetics
  • 1985: 58.7% of total European semiconductor consumption was imported
  • None of Europe's top 4 semiconductor manufacturing countries were self-sufficient

Strategic Importance of Semiconductor Manufacturing

  • Semiconductors critical components in all IT products
  • Enable new industries: consumer electronics, personal computers, gaming, AI
  • Essential for Europe's key industries: cars, planes, industrial electronics
  • Late 1970s: VLSI (Very Large-Scale Integration) systems seen as economically transformative
  • European dependence on foreign imports strategically threatening
  • Reduced Europe's control over future technology roadmap

European Market Challenges

  • Missing several big semiconductor demand drivers
  • Big markets in 1970s-80s: computers, telecommunications, industrial, government, military
  • Europe's weaknesses:
    • Computer companies lost to IBM
    • Military markets smaller than America's
    • Telecommunications highly fragmented
    • Strong only in automobile/industrial markets
  • Result: Europe focused on discrete/analog chips (mature technology) vs integrated circuits (leading edge)

National Champions Policy (Post-WWII to 1970s)

  • European countries created national champions across various fields
  • Policy logic: native players needed more scale to compete with Americans
  • Government support through:
    • Preferential procurement policies by public agencies
    • R&D subsidies
  • Policy failures:
    • National champions uncompetitive outside home markets
    • Government interference to preserve political goals
    • Companies split markets among themselves (e.g., France's CGE and Thompson 1969 Yalta agreement)
  • Key national champions:
    • SGS (Italy)
    • Thompson (France)
    • Inmos (United Kingdom)
    • SGS-Thompson merger in 1987 (later became ST Microelectronics)

ST Microelectronics Current Performance

  • 2022: $16 billion revenue, $4 billion profit
  • Core markets: automotive and microcontrollers
  • Comparison: TSMC made more revenue/profit in Q4 2022 than ST's entire 2022 performance

ESPRIT Program Launch (1983)

  • Launched by EC under Belgian Étienne Davignon
  • European Strategic Program for Research and Development in Information Technology
  • Logic: Europe strong in academic research but weak at bringing research to market
  • European R&D lagged: 2% GDP vs Japan/America's 3%
  • 1979-1980: Davignon assembled leaders of Europe's 12 biggest IT/electronics companies
  • Considered "European Airbus for semiconductors" but settled on pan-European research collaboration
  • Goals:
    • Transfer advanced technologies to European companies
    • Improve cooperation between companies
    • Achieve semiconductor parity with US/Japan in 10 years

ESPRIT Program Details and Results

  • Funded projects from businesses and universities
  • Focus areas: advanced technologies, manufacturing tools, international standards
  • Avoided near-commercial products to comply with trade competition laws
  • Successes:
    • European companies improved technological competencies
    • Innovation in millimeter wave communication systems, material technologies, fiber optics
    • Inspired programs for telecommunications and biotechnology
  • Failures:
    • Research technologies too far up development chain for market impact
    • Few technologies eventually came to market
    • Majority of funding went to Big 12 firms rather than SMEs

Eureka Initiative (1985)

  • Proposed by France's President Mitterrand
  • Response to America's Strategic Defense Initiative
  • Goal: create "technological Europe"
  • Focused on products closer to commercialization than ESPRIT
  • Expanded to include governments outside EU (Central/Eastern Europe)
  • By 1997: nearly 1,200 ongoing/finished projects worth €16.7 billion
  • Significant portion tied to JESSI (Joint European Sub-micron Silicon Initiative)
  • JESSI failed to create leading edge DRAM chips
  • Criticism: spread resources too thinly across too many technologies

Trade Protection Measures

  • Thompson argued for higher tariffs on foreign electronics imports
  • 1986: EC raised tariffs on VCRs to stem Japanese imports
  • Lowered tariffs on clock radios and calculators as concession to Japan
  • Reduced finished semiconductor tariffs from 17% to 14%
  • Finnish wafer tariffs remained 9% throughout decade
  • Encouraged foreign manufacturers to import wafers and do packaging onshore

Anti-Dumping Actions

  • 1987: EC brought anti-dumping case against Japanese DRAM industry
  • 1989: Agreement negotiated to create price floor
  • European computer makers (DRAM consumers) opposed deal
  • 1990: Japanese agreed to self-implement price limits
  • By then Japanese semiconductor decline already underway, Koreans climbing toward memory summit

European Market Share Decline

  • Despite all policies, Europe's global semiconductor market share continued declining
  • 1991: European producers market share fell to ~10%
  • Remained at 10% for three decades since (likely lower today)
  • Over 80% of European semiconductor production from West Germany, France, Italy, UK

National Champions Decline

  • West Germany: Once Europe's semiconductor leader, production declined in second half of 1980s due to Siemens' worsening competitiveness
  • Phillips: Europe's one globally competitive electronics company hit financial/managerial crisis
  • Foreign takeovers: ICL acquired by Fujitsu, making policy implementation harder
  • 1984 Mega project: Siemens-Phillips collaboration to produce leading edge DRAM failed

Critical 1980s Window

  • Last open window for Europeans to gain ground in semiconductors
  • Key events:
    • Fall of Japanese semiconductor industry
    • Rise of Taiwanese (TSMC founded 1987) and South Korean (Samsung taking share from 1986) giants
    • Technological shift in manufacturing equipment (Intel failed to master steppers, stagnated 1979-1985)
  • Results: Samsung cornered memory market, Intel dominated PC CPU, TSMC shut door with foundry model
  • ASML (European lithography success) sells all production to Asia and US

Policy Lessons

  • 1960s European thinking: American success due to company size (IBM)
  • Attempted to create big national champions via mergers
  • Real reason for American tech success: ability to allow small companies to grow big
  • 1980s policymakers understood this but still couldn't break attachment to big companies
  • Continued attachment to failing big companies led to policy failure

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