Summary by TwinMind · 6m 34s
Summary by TwinMind · 6m 34s
Explaining China's "No First Use" Nuclear Weapons Policy
Explaining China's "No First Use" Nuclear Weapons Policy
Asianometry
Asianometry
China's Nuclear Arsenal Size and Comparison
- China estimated to have ~290 nuclear weapons
- Fewest among five NPT signatories
- Russia: 6,500 warheads
- United States: 6,100 warheads
- Despite small arsenal, policies and usage implications worth exploring
No First Use Policy
- China's foremost nuclear strategy: will not be first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances
- First nuclear-armed country to adopt this policy (1964)
- Aimed to avoid sparking three-way arms race between China, Soviets, and US
- Other countries repeatedly declined adopting policy despite international pressure
- PLA reaffirmed adherence in July 2019 defense white paper
Practical Reasons for No First Use
- PLA lacks advanced missiles compared to US
- Less than half of weapons capable of hitting continental US
- Cannot hit US nuclear second-strike capability
- Cannot stop retaliatory attacks
- Weapons are "broad sledgehammers": 200-300 kiloton yields
- Compare to US B61 bombs: capable of 0.3 kiloton yields
- Using one weapon causes maximum damage, elicits immediate immense retaliation
Philosophical Roots
- Policy traces back to Chairman Mao and first generation PLA generals
- Belief: nuclear weapons have limited utility in war
- Deng Xiaoping's 1980s view: "if you have them I will have them, if we have more I will have more, perhaps no one will dare use them"
- Conventional war possible and winnable
- Nuclear weapons needed only for defensive deterrence
Strategic Focus
- No first use allows PLA to focus on Navy, Air Force, Army, cyber warfare
- Seeks to win conventional battles in local context against local actors
- Attempts quick victories hoping to de-escalate before nuclear threshold
- Utilizes China's immense size and population to wear down enemies
- Aims for victory or favorable ending through conventional means
2015 Military Reorganization
- China reorganized/modernized Armed Forces (PLA)
- Goal: improve command lines
- Created PLA Rocket Force as co-equal branch alongside Army, Navy, Air Force
- Responsible for maintaining conventional and nuclear missiles
- Unclear if includes nuclear weapons maintained by PLA Air Force and Navy
Nuclear Weapons Control and Paranoia
- Chinese Communist Party paranoid about accidental firing
- Rumors: nuclear warheads stored separately from missiles
- Will wait and confirm attack before retaliating
- Willing to accept tactical losses (e.g., Shanghai's 30 million people)
- Rocket Force reports only to Central Military Commission (CMC)
- CMC: power behind Communist Party, made up of party officials and military types
- Nuclear firing signal comes exclusively from CMC
- Confirmed through interviews with dozens of current/retired rocket force officers
- All military policy materials: fire nuclear weapons only "when CMC says you should"
- CMC decision-making process entirely opaque - no public information available
Current PLA Focus on US Conflict
- Primary focus: beating United States in certain theaters of war
- Studying Cold War doctrines and materiel to understand US nuclear beliefs
- Conclusion: USA will not militarily intervene for East Asian allies (Taiwan, Japan) using nuclear weapons
- Believe US officials will work behind scenes to defuse situations
- Assessment: if chips are down, US will abandon ally rather than risk nuclear damage to homeland
- Willing to accept "Titanic loss of face" rather than risk nuclear war
War Termination Strategy
- PLA not eager to test assumptions about US behavior
- If conventional war going badly, likely to seek face-saving resolution
- May terminate war on unfavorable terms rather than use nuclear weapons
- Core goal: regime survival
- Believe China cannot survive full-bore nuclear war
