Summary by TwinMind · 6m 34s
Summary by TwinMind · 6m 34s

Explaining China's "No First Use" Nuclear Weapons Policy

Explaining China's "No First Use" Nuclear Weapons Policy

Asianometry

Asianometry

China's Nuclear Arsenal Size and Comparison

  • China estimated to have ~290 nuclear weapons
  • Fewest among five NPT signatories
    • Russia: 6,500 warheads
    • United States: 6,100 warheads
  • Despite small arsenal, policies and usage implications worth exploring

No First Use Policy

  • China's foremost nuclear strategy: will not be first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances
  • First nuclear-armed country to adopt this policy (1964)
  • Aimed to avoid sparking three-way arms race between China, Soviets, and US
  • Other countries repeatedly declined adopting policy despite international pressure
  • PLA reaffirmed adherence in July 2019 defense white paper

Practical Reasons for No First Use

  • PLA lacks advanced missiles compared to US
  • Less than half of weapons capable of hitting continental US
  • Cannot hit US nuclear second-strike capability
  • Cannot stop retaliatory attacks
  • Weapons are "broad sledgehammers": 200-300 kiloton yields
    • Compare to US B61 bombs: capable of 0.3 kiloton yields
  • Using one weapon causes maximum damage, elicits immediate immense retaliation

Philosophical Roots

  • Policy traces back to Chairman Mao and first generation PLA generals
  • Belief: nuclear weapons have limited utility in war
  • Deng Xiaoping's 1980s view: "if you have them I will have them, if we have more I will have more, perhaps no one will dare use them"
  • Conventional war possible and winnable
  • Nuclear weapons needed only for defensive deterrence

Strategic Focus

  • No first use allows PLA to focus on Navy, Air Force, Army, cyber warfare
  • Seeks to win conventional battles in local context against local actors
  • Attempts quick victories hoping to de-escalate before nuclear threshold
  • Utilizes China's immense size and population to wear down enemies
  • Aims for victory or favorable ending through conventional means

2015 Military Reorganization

  • China reorganized/modernized Armed Forces (PLA)
  • Goal: improve command lines
  • Created PLA Rocket Force as co-equal branch alongside Army, Navy, Air Force
  • Responsible for maintaining conventional and nuclear missiles
  • Unclear if includes nuclear weapons maintained by PLA Air Force and Navy

Nuclear Weapons Control and Paranoia

  • Chinese Communist Party paranoid about accidental firing
  • Rumors: nuclear warheads stored separately from missiles
  • Will wait and confirm attack before retaliating
  • Willing to accept tactical losses (e.g., Shanghai's 30 million people)
  • Rocket Force reports only to Central Military Commission (CMC)
  • CMC: power behind Communist Party, made up of party officials and military types
  • Nuclear firing signal comes exclusively from CMC
  • Confirmed through interviews with dozens of current/retired rocket force officers
  • All military policy materials: fire nuclear weapons only "when CMC says you should"
  • CMC decision-making process entirely opaque - no public information available

Current PLA Focus on US Conflict

  • Primary focus: beating United States in certain theaters of war
  • Studying Cold War doctrines and materiel to understand US nuclear beliefs
  • Conclusion: USA will not militarily intervene for East Asian allies (Taiwan, Japan) using nuclear weapons
  • Believe US officials will work behind scenes to defuse situations
  • Assessment: if chips are down, US will abandon ally rather than risk nuclear damage to homeland
  • Willing to accept "Titanic loss of face" rather than risk nuclear war

War Termination Strategy

  • PLA not eager to test assumptions about US behavior
  • If conventional war going badly, likely to seek face-saving resolution
  • May terminate war on unfavorable terms rather than use nuclear weapons
  • Core goal: regime survival
  • Believe China cannot survive full-bore nuclear war