AI summary by TwinMind
Hongxin: China’s Billion Dollar Semiconductor Failure
Asianometry
13m 25s
China's Semiconductor Dependency & National Response
- China imports $300B+ semiconductors annually
- Reliant on chip technology imports for high-tech products
- Recognized as potential economic weakness
- 2014: Launched $20B national fund for domestic chip industry development
- Government goal: cutting-edge chip manufacturing within few years
- Willing to spend "almost whatever it takes" for homegrown industry
HSMC Company Formation & Ambitious Claims
- Founded November 2017 as Wuhan Hongxing Semiconductor Manufacturing (HSMC/Hong Shin)
- Target: 30,000 wafers/month capacity
- 14nm process node initially
- 7nm process node planned
- Capacity would match TSMC mega fabs in scale
- Comparison: TSMC Fab 18 produces 100,000 wafers/month, built in 2.5 years
Key Credibility Moves
- July 2019: Hired Chang Shan Yi as CEO
- Former TSMC R&D VP, 75 years old
- Independent director at SMIC 2016-2019
- Legitimate chip manufacturing expert
- December 2019: Purchased ASML TwinScan XT 1980 DUV lithography scanner
- Cost: 581M RMB ($87M USD)
- Theoretically enables 10nm chip etching
- Claimed only device in China for 7nm chips (false claim)
- One month later: Used as collateral for bank loan
- Bank statement: Device "new and never used"
Government Funding & Investment
- September 2018: Wuhan featured 33 high-tech manufacturing projects
- Total Wuhan investment: $16B across projects
- HSMC + one other company received 80% of $16B
- HSMC received largest portion from Wuhan:
- 636 acres of land
- 636,000 sq meter building under construction
- Total project cost: 128B RMB ($20B USD)
- Promised 3,000 high-value jobs
- End 2019: Received $2B from Wuhan city government
- 2020: Expected additional $1B
- Never received full $20B as planned
Talent Acquisition Strategy
- Joined race for Taiwanese semiconductor talent
- Offered 2-2.5x market rate salaries for TSMC R&D employees
- Poached ~100 people from TSMC
Financial Problems Begin
- July 2020: Construction subcontractor Wuhan Juanyu Foundation Engineering
- Accused HSMC of not paying $5M in bills
- Took company to court for payment
Ownership Structure Revealed
- HSMC 90% owned by shell company
- Controlled by two individuals:
- Lee Shi Yen: No semiconductor experience
- Owns Chinese liquor retailer, catering companies, medical companies
- Tao Shen
- Lee Shi Yen: No semiconductor experience
- Shell company invested no money into HSMC
- Funding sources:
- Local Wuhan government
- Loans from construction subcontractors
Escalating Financial Crisis
- Wages not being paid
- Job offers rescinded/delayed
- Bank accounts frozen
- Provincial court reclaimed 300 acres land usage rights due to unpaid bills
Financial Discrepancies
- Claimed billions received from Wuhan government
- Unable to pay $5M to construction subcontractor
- $87M TwinScan machine immediately remortgaged
- Unclear where $3B+ funding actually went
Business Model Analysis
- "Silicon Valley bootstrap" approach using other people's money
- Strategy: String along based on hype and local government cash
- Local officials easily "bamboozled with fancy words"
- Promise of having TSMC equivalent in their city
- Similar to Wisconsin Foxconn situation
- Local governments lack sufficient cash, only provide:
- Land usage rights (not liquid cash)
- Small grants
- Goal: Access central government's national semiconductor fund
Company Collapse
- December 2019 court case prevented national semiconductor fund application
- COVID-19 pandemic ended project completely
- Plants fell through
Founder's Next Ventures
- Tao Shen exited HSMC, started new companies:
- Zhuhai Yi Shin Integrated Technology
- Hired ex-TSMC person Xia Jingcho as CEO
- Set up Quanxing Integrated Circuit Manufacturing
- Set up Yunxin International Integrated Circuit Manufacturing
- Same model repeated with different local governments
- Pattern: Promise TSMC equivalent to different cities for funding
Other Chinese Semiconductor Failures
- 2019: Hwai Semiconductor (Jiangsu Province)
- Collapsed under unpaid wages and lawsuits
- $700M investment, $14M+ debt
- July 2020: Dakema (Nanjing) bankruptcy
- Raised $3B from investors including municipal government
- Built indigenous image sensors
- Result: Two unfinished buildings, zero wafers produced
China's Tech Market Fever Pattern
- Historical precedents: Ride-sharing wars (Uber vs DD), bike-sharing wars
- Similar fever rolling over semiconductor manufacturing
- SMIC public listing: 100% stock price explosion first day
- Building campuses with Korean/Taiwan accommodations for poached engineers
- Hundreds of chip engineers planned to be poached from Samsung/TSMC
Industry Analysis & Recommendations
- Semiconductor manufacturing requires:
- Serious national-level resources
- "Mount Kilimanjaro" of cash
- Base of expertise
- Infinite patience
- Extensive talent building
- Timeline: Not achievable in 2, 5, or even 10 years
- Singapore case study: Government lost interest, foundry industry stagnated
- China should study Singapore's lessons
- Common failure theme: Founders want fast in-and-out results
- Example: Pinduoduo (founded 2015/2016, $1B company in 2 years, CEO retired after 4 years)
- Fast approach causes mistakes, acceptable for many industries but not semiconductors
- Formula for fast failure in semiconductor manufacturing
Conclusion Assessment
- Uncertain if HSMC was fraud or legitimate failure
- Possible scenarios:
- Took $500M, hired people, built PR, attempted building, kept $1.5B
- Legitimately tried rapid growth and failed
- Chinese government claims increased focus on vetting
- Result: Wasted taxpayer money, lost time, hype leading to nothing
