AI summary by TwinMind
How Big Banks Stack Up to Silicon Valley Bank - Are Big Unrealized Losses a Risk?
The Plain Bagel
18m 21s
Bank Size Comparison
- Big 4 US banks (JP Morgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo) deposits: 1.3-2.3 trillion dollars
- ~10x larger than Silicon Valley Bank at midpoint
- All labeled as G-SIBs (Global Systemically Important Banks)
- Failure would have significant global financial system implications
Liquidity Risk Assessment
- High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) - Basel III standardized measure
- Tiers assets by liquidity/ease of sale without discount
- Cash = 100% value included
- Less liquid assets = up to 50% haircut from fair value
- Incorporates discount for possible fire sale situations
- Big 4 banks: 25-42% of deposits backed by HQLA
- Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) - HQLA divided by expected 30-day stressed withdrawals
- Required to stay above 100%
- Big 4 banks: ~120% across board (JP Morgan: 112% firm-wide, 151% banking operations)
- Assumed withdrawal rates: 15-36% of total deposits over 30-day stress period
Silicon Valley Bank Comparison Issues
- Regional banks not required to disclose same Basel III information
- SVB didn't disclose standardized HQLA measure or LCR ratio
- Conflicting estimates for SVB's LCR - exact figures unknown due to missing regulatory filing details
Solvency Analysis - CET1 Ratios
- Common Equity Tier 1 Capital divided by risk-weighted assets
- CET1 = common equity + retained earnings (first line of defense against losses)
- Risk-weighted assets: cash/treasuries have 0% weighting, riskier assets weighted higher
- Big 4 banks: all above 10% (meet minimums)
- SVB reported CET1: ~12% (higher than peer group)
- Regional banks can exclude AOCI (accumulated other comprehensive income)
- SVB opted out of standard including losses from available-for-sale securities
- Adjusted SVB CET1: 10.4% (still comparable to peer group)
Securities Classifications & Accounting
- Trading Securities: held for trading, reports to net income
- Available for Sale: bank interested in selling, unrealized gains/losses flow through AOCI
- Held to Maturity: debt securities held until maturity
- Recorded at amortized cost (purchase price + amortization adjustment)
- Don't reflect current market value
- Forced sale could cause unrealized gains/losses not reflected in CET1 ratio
Unrealized Losses on Held to Maturity Assets
- SVB unrealized losses: $15.2 billion (more than their CET1 capital)
- Big 4 banks unrealized losses (dollar amounts):
- Bank of America: >$100 billion (largest amount, -17% value drop)
- All banks have losses on held-to-maturity portfolios
- Losses relative to CET1 capital:
- Bank of America: 60% of CET1 capital
- Not as severe as SVB but still significant
Maturity Profile Analysis
- Longer maturity = higher price sensitivity to rising rates
- Bank of America: vast majority of held-to-maturity assets in 10+ year securities
- JP Morgan: ~42% in 10+ year securities
- SVB: 94.2% in 10+ year maturities
- Most yielding ~2% for next 10 years, can't be sold without massive loss
Risk Management Differences
- SVB poorly managed from risk perspective
- No chief risk officer for 8 months
- Derivatives portfolio: $5.65 billion notional value (~2.7% of total assets)
- Hedging derivatives: $550 million notional (~0.3% of total assets)
- Big 4 banks derivatives (interest rate specific):
- Bank of America: $24.3 trillion notional (8x total assets)
- All large banks: tens of trillions in notional values
- Citigroup/Wells Fargo hedging: 11-14% of total assets vs SVB's 0.2%
Risk Mitigation Factors
- Held-to-maturity losses only issue during bank runs
- If held to maturity, no actual loss realized (get face value back)
- Big 4 banks lower bank run risk than SVB:
- Much larger size (requires significant population withdrawal)
- More diversified (SVB focused on VC/startup space in California)
- Higher FDIC insurance coverage
- SVB: 95.5% deposits uninsured
- Citigroup: ~85% uninsured (highest among Big 4)
- Bank of America: 37.3% uninsured (lowest)
Federal Reserve Lending Program
- Banks can borrow up to 1 year using par value of assets as collateral
- Avoids selling bonds at loss during rapid withdrawals
- Borrow against assets at par value without recognizing unrealized loss
Interest Rate Impact
- Banks benefit from rising rates long-term
- All banks except JP Morgan show positive impact from 100 basis point parallel rate shift
- Volatility affects short-term profitability but improves long-term margins
Remaining Risks
- Bank runs can destroy even healthiest institutions
- Risk depends on depositor trust
- Unknown factors may surface (as with SVB)
- Regional banks still face elevated risk
- Higher-yielding alternatives to bank accounts
- May not be deemed "too big to fail"
- Still face pressure from heightened withdrawals
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