AI summary by TwinMind
KUKA: When China Bought Germany's Robots
Asianometry
13m 24s
Chinese Investment Context & Policy Concerns
- Mid-2010s: massive Chinese multinational buying spree targeting world's most valuable assets
- Policy maker concerns about Chinese companies:
- 50% of "private" Chinese companies under direct control of high-ranking party members
- Informal/hard-to-track influence through family lines
- All large Chinese companies required to establish Communist Party committees
- Chinese companies need government permission for overseas investment due to capital controls
- Chinese companies operating under "Going Global" policy directive
- Made in China 2025 policy: Beijing's goal to move up industrial value chain, own underlying technologies
- Perceived as Chinese companies acting in service of foreign policy by acquiring sophisticated high-end technology for transfer
German-Chinese Relations Pre-KUKA
- Relations warmed considerably throughout 2010s
- Weak European economic situation (2010) forced German companies to woo Chinese market
- Chinese middle-class consumers buying German products, especially cars
- 2014: China became Germany's 4th largest export partner, 2nd largest import partner
- German exports to China (2008-2014): €74 billion, up 118% over previous years
- Imports from China: €80 billion, up 34%
- Trade deficit existed but relationship strong enough for government to brush aside German company complaints about technology transfer issues
Chinese Investment Surge in Germany
- Initially seen as opportunity: Chinese money could help failing German companies, serve as private equity
- Investment jump starting 2014:
- Until 2013: stuck at ~€0.6 billion
- 2014: hit €1 billion abruptly
- 2015: €2 billion (€1.2 billion figure likely underestimates actual amount due to Luxembourg shell companies)
- Alarm: Chinese investors buying big stakes in Germany's leading technology companies:
- AVIC Group (aeronautic equipment)
- Krauss Maffei (plastic/rubber goods)
- EEW Energy (renewable energy)
- Contrast to struggling laggards politicians initially expected Chinese money to target
- China continued blocking European investment in its own leading technology companies
KUKA Company Background
- Founded 1898 in Augsburg, Germany
- Started with light products/household appliances, pivoted to autonomous welding products
- Leading position in industrial robotics, specialty in automotive
- 13,000+ employees across 25 countries
- Customers: Boeing, SpaceX, Airbus, GM, Chrysler, Volkswagen
- Robots prominent in automotive assembly, aerospace, retail, rail
- Featured in music videos, movies - somewhat iconic
- Technology extremely valuable and hard-earned
Midea's Acquisition Strategy
- Guangdong Midea Group: makes lighting goods, laundry, cooking appliances, mainly air conditioners
- Founded 1968, €21 billion revenue (2015)
- Co-founder: one of China's richest men (€36 billion fortune)
- Publicly listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange, no apparent direct government ties
- Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Midea VP Andy Gu emphasized Midea is private company
- 2015: bought 5.4% of KUKA stock
- 2016: raised stake to 10.2%, became second largest investor after German industrial group Voith (25%)
- Declared interest in investing more, citing KUKA's advanced robotics/automation technology
The €4.5 Billion Acquisition
- May 2016: Midea made stunning offer for KUKA: €4.5 billion
- 60% premium over February 2016 stock price
- Concerns: KUKA robots used in world's most advanced factories, acquirer could access all customer knowledge/know-how
- Midea's strategy: acquired shares slowly step-by-step to dissipate public anger
- KUKA management and supervisory boards strongly supported deal
- Midea signed agreements restricting corporate reorganizations for 7.5 years
- Offer so high that German government couldn't find alternative European buyers (Siemens, ABB had no takers)
Regulatory Approval Process
- August 2016: Berlin approved acquisition of 94.5% of KUKA shares
- German government lacked legal apparatus to block acquisition
- Couldn't do formal inquiry unless touching sensitive sectors (power, water safety, telecommunications)
- US different story: CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment) authorized to investigate/block acquisitions
- KUKA had US subsidiaries, so CFIUS involved
- December 2016: KUKA carved out US aeronautics subsidiary, sold to Texas-based AIT Inc
- Chinese law would have prevented KUKA from holding subsidiary anyway (close ties to US arms manufacturers)
- Carve-out satisfied CFIUS, approved acquisition late December 2016 (after Trump election, before taking office)
Post-Acquisition Developments & Fallout
- July 2016: KUKA announced joint venture with subsidiary of Chinese state-owned military enterprise China South Industries Group Corp
- German perspective: Chinese company acquired 100+ years of high-end technology expertise
- Chinese perspective: bitter taste - paid hard currency, no German law made robotics technology purchase illegal, had to pay massive premium over market price
- Argument: Midea extorted due to vaguely racist anti-Chinese mood
- Midea went above/beyond what European/American/Japanese acquirers would have done
End of Chinese Acquisition Spree
- 2017: Chinese government reimposed stronger currency controls
- Several large multinationals required to dispose of acquisitions
- Mood had shifted, US-China trade war began
- Acquisition spree came to end
