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Lec 14: Oligopoly II

MIT OpenCourseWare

45m 18s

Cartel Formation and Theory

  • Firms can cooperate vs compete in oligopolistic markets
  • Cartel formation: firms act as single monopoly, split profits
  • Example: American/United airlines with demand curve P = 339 - q, marginal cost = 147
    • Monopoly solution: q = 96, P = 243
    • Cartel: each firm produces 48 flights, splits total profits of 9,216
    • Each firm gets 4,608 profits vs 4,096 in Cournot equilibrium
    • Cartel profits 12.5% higher than non-cooperative equilibrium

Cartel Instability - Economic Incentives

  • Two reasons cartels don't dominate markets:
    • Economic: fundamental instability (prisoner's dilemma)
    • Legal: antitrust laws
  • Cheating incentive analysis:
    • American cheats: increases flights from 48 to 50
    • Total quantity rises to 98, price falls from 243 to 241
    • American's profits rise to 4,700 (gain of 92)
    • United's profits fall to 4,512 (loss of 96)
    • Total market profits shrink from 9,216 to 9,212
  • Poisoning effect: cheater gets all benefits, shares costs with competitors
  • Public goods problem: limiting quantity benefits both firms, cheating benefits only one

Historical Context and Legal Framework

  • Late 1800s: cartels common (robber barons/Gilded Age)
  • Rockefellers, Vanderbilts controlled oil, railroad industries
  • Standard Oil trust mechanism:
    • Common board controlled industry pricing/quantity decisions
    • Monitored production and pricing across firms
  • Antitrust movement response:
    • Anti-cartel laws developed
    • Designed to break down cartels and trusts

Real-World Cartel Examples

Hollywood Movie Industry (1930s-40s)

  • Few big firms: MGM, Fox, Warner
  • Vertical integration: bought movie theaters
  • Created anti-competitive practice: Warner theaters only showed Warner movies
  • Eliminated competition between movie studios in local markets
  • Antitrust intervention eventually broke up practice

British Airways-Virgin Atlantic Case (2004)

  • Two dominant trans-Atlantic airlines
  • Secret coordination on oil surcharge fees
  • Raised charges from $10 to $120 per ticket
  • Agreed not to undercut each other on "shrouded attribute"
  • Virgin's lawyers preemptively reported to regulators
  • Virgin paid nothing, British Airways fined $500 million
  • Demonstrates cartel instability through strategic defection

NFL Antitrust Exemption

  • 32 teams = 32 businesses in same market
  • League sells TV rights collectively, not individual teams
  • Prevents price competition between teams
  • Creates expensive, fragmented viewing experience
  • 1957 Supreme Court ruled anti-competitive
  • Congress granted antitrust exemption for "national priority"
  • NFL makes $40 billion annually from collusive structure

Japanese Auto "Voluntary Export Restraint" (1981)

  • Reagan administration faced Japanese car competition
  • Created "voluntary export restraint" (VER)
  • Limited Japanese car imports from 2 million to 1.5 million annually
  • Government-enforced cartelization of Japanese auto industry
  • Japanese car prices rose 14% in US
  • US consumers lost $3 billion in consumer surplus

Market Structure Comparison

Quantity and Profit Analysis

  • Monopoly: q = 96, profits per firm = 4,608
  • Cournot (2 firms): q = 128, profits per firm = 4,096
  • Perfect competition: q = 192, profits per firm = 0
  • Pattern: more competition → higher quantity, lower profits

Welfare Implications

  • Perfect competition maximizes welfare (First Fundamental Welfare Theorem)
  • Dead weight loss proportional to quantity restriction from competitive level
  • More quantity restriction = more beneficial trades not made
  • Producer surplus rises but consumer surplus falls faster
  • Total social welfare decreases as market becomes less competitive

N-Firm Oligopoly Analysis

  • Cournot equilibrium approaches perfect competition as N → ∞
  • Approaches monopoly as N → 1
  • Markup formula: -1/(N × ε) where ε = elasticity of demand
  • Two effects of more firms:
    • Direct: mechanical reduction in markup/profits
    • Indirect: harder to maintain cartels with more players
  • Mercury cartel example: Italy-Spain duopoly broke down when Russia entered

Antitrust Policy Applications

Google Search Case (Current)

  • MIT's Mike Whinston as key government expert witness
  • Google pays Apple $10 billion/year for iPhone default search
  • Key question: 92% market share from being better vs paying for defaults
  • Judge must determine fair competition vs anti-competitive behavior

Amazon Marketplace Case (Upcoming)

  • 40% of Amazon sales from third-party vendors
  • Amazon takes ~25% of vendor profits through fees
  • Government argues: dominance in online search creates monopoly power
  • Amazon defense: only 8% of total US goods market, competes with brick-and-mortar

Hospital Merger Analysis

  • Trade-off: cost efficiencies vs market power
  • Historical approach: allowed mergers assuming efficiency gains
  • Research showed: hospitals don't become efficient, just raise prices
  • Policy shift: increased scrutiny of hospital mergers

Bertrand vs Cournot Competition Models

Bertrand Model (Price Competition)

  • Firms compete on price, market determines quantity
  • Two firms sufficient for perfect competitive outcome
  • Price competition leads to marginal cost pricing
  • Undercutting continues until P = MC

Model Selection Criteria

  • Price competition: when firms can instantaneously meet demand
    • Example: breakfast cereals (rapid production/distribution)
  • Quantity competition: when production lags exist
    • Example: cars (months to increase production)
  • Reality: mix of both approaches

Product Differentiation Strategy

Breakfast Cereal Evolution

  • WWII era: 3 cereal types (Cheerios, cornflakes, Quaker Oats)
  • 1970: 150+ cereals due to generic competition
  • 1989: Apple Cinnamon Cheerios introduction
  • Strategy: create mini-monopolies through differentiation
  • Patent protection provided temporary competitive advantage

Welfare Analysis of Differentiation

  • Positive: reveals consumer preference for variety
  • Jerry Hausman estimated: Apple Cinnamon Cheerios added $75 million annual consumer surplus
  • Negative: monopoly pricing on differentiated products
  • Second-best outcome: better than no variety, worse than competitive pricing
  • Current state: 5 firms produce 5,000+ cereal varieties

Choice Overload Consideration

  • Standard economics: more choices always better
  • Emerging concern: too many options may reduce consumer welfare
  • Behavioral economics challenge to traditional assumptions
  • Links to upcoming behavioral economics coverage

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