AI summary by TwinMind
Lec 14: Oligopoly II
MIT OpenCourseWare
45m 18s
Cartel Formation and Theory
- Firms can cooperate vs compete in oligopolistic markets
- Cartel formation: firms act as single monopoly, split profits
- Example: American/United airlines with demand curve P = 339 - q, marginal cost = 147
- Monopoly solution: q = 96, P = 243
- Cartel: each firm produces 48 flights, splits total profits of 9,216
- Each firm gets 4,608 profits vs 4,096 in Cournot equilibrium
- Cartel profits 12.5% higher than non-cooperative equilibrium
Cartel Instability - Economic Incentives
- Two reasons cartels don't dominate markets:
- Economic: fundamental instability (prisoner's dilemma)
- Legal: antitrust laws
- Cheating incentive analysis:
- American cheats: increases flights from 48 to 50
- Total quantity rises to 98, price falls from 243 to 241
- American's profits rise to 4,700 (gain of 92)
- United's profits fall to 4,512 (loss of 96)
- Total market profits shrink from 9,216 to 9,212
- Poisoning effect: cheater gets all benefits, shares costs with competitors
- Public goods problem: limiting quantity benefits both firms, cheating benefits only one
Historical Context and Legal Framework
- Late 1800s: cartels common (robber barons/Gilded Age)
- Rockefellers, Vanderbilts controlled oil, railroad industries
- Standard Oil trust mechanism:
- Common board controlled industry pricing/quantity decisions
- Monitored production and pricing across firms
- Antitrust movement response:
- Anti-cartel laws developed
- Designed to break down cartels and trusts
Real-World Cartel Examples
Hollywood Movie Industry (1930s-40s)
- Few big firms: MGM, Fox, Warner
- Vertical integration: bought movie theaters
- Created anti-competitive practice: Warner theaters only showed Warner movies
- Eliminated competition between movie studios in local markets
- Antitrust intervention eventually broke up practice
British Airways-Virgin Atlantic Case (2004)
- Two dominant trans-Atlantic airlines
- Secret coordination on oil surcharge fees
- Raised charges from $10 to $120 per ticket
- Agreed not to undercut each other on "shrouded attribute"
- Virgin's lawyers preemptively reported to regulators
- Virgin paid nothing, British Airways fined $500 million
- Demonstrates cartel instability through strategic defection
NFL Antitrust Exemption
- 32 teams = 32 businesses in same market
- League sells TV rights collectively, not individual teams
- Prevents price competition between teams
- Creates expensive, fragmented viewing experience
- 1957 Supreme Court ruled anti-competitive
- Congress granted antitrust exemption for "national priority"
- NFL makes $40 billion annually from collusive structure
Japanese Auto "Voluntary Export Restraint" (1981)
- Reagan administration faced Japanese car competition
- Created "voluntary export restraint" (VER)
- Limited Japanese car imports from 2 million to 1.5 million annually
- Government-enforced cartelization of Japanese auto industry
- Japanese car prices rose 14% in US
- US consumers lost $3 billion in consumer surplus
Market Structure Comparison
Quantity and Profit Analysis
- Monopoly: q = 96, profits per firm = 4,608
- Cournot (2 firms): q = 128, profits per firm = 4,096
- Perfect competition: q = 192, profits per firm = 0
- Pattern: more competition → higher quantity, lower profits
Welfare Implications
- Perfect competition maximizes welfare (First Fundamental Welfare Theorem)
- Dead weight loss proportional to quantity restriction from competitive level
- More quantity restriction = more beneficial trades not made
- Producer surplus rises but consumer surplus falls faster
- Total social welfare decreases as market becomes less competitive
N-Firm Oligopoly Analysis
- Cournot equilibrium approaches perfect competition as N → ∞
- Approaches monopoly as N → 1
- Markup formula: -1/(N × ε) where ε = elasticity of demand
- Two effects of more firms:
- Direct: mechanical reduction in markup/profits
- Indirect: harder to maintain cartels with more players
- Mercury cartel example: Italy-Spain duopoly broke down when Russia entered
Antitrust Policy Applications
Google Search Case (Current)
- MIT's Mike Whinston as key government expert witness
- Google pays Apple $10 billion/year for iPhone default search
- Key question: 92% market share from being better vs paying for defaults
- Judge must determine fair competition vs anti-competitive behavior
Amazon Marketplace Case (Upcoming)
- 40% of Amazon sales from third-party vendors
- Amazon takes ~25% of vendor profits through fees
- Government argues: dominance in online search creates monopoly power
- Amazon defense: only 8% of total US goods market, competes with brick-and-mortar
Hospital Merger Analysis
- Trade-off: cost efficiencies vs market power
- Historical approach: allowed mergers assuming efficiency gains
- Research showed: hospitals don't become efficient, just raise prices
- Policy shift: increased scrutiny of hospital mergers
Bertrand vs Cournot Competition Models
Bertrand Model (Price Competition)
- Firms compete on price, market determines quantity
- Two firms sufficient for perfect competitive outcome
- Price competition leads to marginal cost pricing
- Undercutting continues until P = MC
Model Selection Criteria
- Price competition: when firms can instantaneously meet demand
- Example: breakfast cereals (rapid production/distribution)
- Quantity competition: when production lags exist
- Example: cars (months to increase production)
- Reality: mix of both approaches
Product Differentiation Strategy
Breakfast Cereal Evolution
- WWII era: 3 cereal types (Cheerios, cornflakes, Quaker Oats)
- 1970: 150+ cereals due to generic competition
- 1989: Apple Cinnamon Cheerios introduction
- Strategy: create mini-monopolies through differentiation
- Patent protection provided temporary competitive advantage
Welfare Analysis of Differentiation
- Positive: reveals consumer preference for variety
- Jerry Hausman estimated: Apple Cinnamon Cheerios added $75 million annual consumer surplus
- Negative: monopoly pricing on differentiated products
- Second-best outcome: better than no variety, worse than competitive pricing
- Current state: 5 firms produce 5,000+ cereal varieties
Choice Overload Consideration
- Standard economics: more choices always better
- Emerging concern: too many options may reduce consumer welfare
- Behavioral economics challenge to traditional assumptions
- Links to upcoming behavioral economics coverage
