AI summary by TwinMind

Lecture 01: Monopoly Pricing and Durable Goods, Part 1

MIT OpenCourseWare

1h 22m 48s

Course Overview and Structure

  • Course 14271 co-taught by instructor (21 lectures), Tobias (4 lectures), Shan terroll (2 lectures)
  • Primary goal: teach students writing IO thesis what they need to know
  • Also useful for students in other fields due to IO's theory-empirical integration and structural empirical techniques
  • Course covers 12 topics, typically 2 lectures each
  • Pattern: Wednesday theory, Monday empirical work
  • IO inherently theoretical field requiring theoretical understanding for policy decisions
    • Examples: Facebook-Instagram divestiture, Google-Apple $12 billion default search deal
    • Cannot use natural experiments for one-time decisions
  • Most successful IO students doing empirical work to test theoretical assumptions and measure effects

Basic Monopoly Pricing Model

  • Standard setup: monopolist sells single product
  • Inverse demand curve P(x), total cost function C(x)
  • Maximize π = x·P(x) - C(x)
  • First order condition: MR = MC
  • Rearranged as Lerner index: (P - MC)/P = -1/ε
    • ε = elasticity of demand
    • Examples: ε = -2 → 50% markup; ε = -4 → 25% markup
  • IO pricing based on demand elasticities, not demand levels
  • Standard welfare analysis: consumer surplus, deadweight loss, producer surplus

Problems with Monopoly Power Beyond Deadweight Loss

  • Productive inefficiency
    • Monopolists may not produce at lowest cost
    • Lack competitive benchmarks
    • Employee laziness without detection
  • Quality distortions
    • Example: Microsoft Windows quality complaints
    • May provide suboptimal quality without competition pressure
  • Rent seeking
    • Example: cell phone license "beauty contests"
    • Story: Washington DC license to Katherine Graham (Washington Post editor)
    • Socially wasteful expenditures to obtain monopoly rents
    • Bribes and lobbying costs can dissipate monopoly profits
  • Equity concerns
    • Transfer from consumers to firms
    • Important if consumers have higher marginal utility of income than shareholders
    • Note: IO typically uses quasi-linear preferences (constant marginal utility of income)

Multi-Product Monopoly Pricing

  • Most real firms sell multiple goods
  • Two-product example: demand X₁(P₁,P₂), X₂(P₁,P₂)
  • Constant marginal costs: C₁, C₂
  • First order conditions include diversion ratio effects
  • Diversion ratio: when price of good 1 increases, how does demand for good 2 change
  • Modified Lerner index includes cross-price effects
  • Critical insight: must think of pricing as system, not individual products
    • Bad example: studying blue iPhone price elasticity holding other iPhone prices fixed
    • Would find high elasticity due to substitution, but wrong pricing conclusion

Substitutes vs Complements Cases

  • Substitutes: raising price of one good increases demand for other
    • Markup exceeds single-product formula
    • Larger diversion ratio → larger markup
  • Complements: raising price of one good decreases demand for other
    • Can price below single-product formula
    • Examples: hamburgers/fries, iPhone/earbuds/chargers, printers/ink
    • Can lead to below-cost or negative pricing
    • Printer example: $99 printer, $59 ink cartridge
    • Historical newspaper example: 50¢ price, $1.50+ production cost, subsidized by advertising
    • Google search: would like negative price, pays Apple billions for default placement

Product Quality Choice

  • Quality s as choice variable along with price P
  • Marginal cost C(s) increasing in quality
  • Consumer heterogeneity: types θ ~ Uniform[0,1]
  • Utility: V(s,θ) - P if buy, 0 if don't buy
  • Assume quality and type ordered: higher θ types have higher willingness to pay

Monopolist's Quality Choice

  • Sells to consumers with θ ≥ 1-Q (highest types)
  • Marginal consumer indifferent: V(s,1-Q) = P
  • First order condition for quality: ∂V/∂s|₁₋Q = ∂C/∂s
  • Monopolist optimizes quality for marginal consumer

Social Planner's Quality Choice

  • First order condition: ∫[1-Q to 1] ∂V/∂s dθ = Q·∂C/∂s
  • Dividing by Q: average ∂V/∂s across consumers = ∂C/∂s
  • Social planner optimizes for average consumer

Quality Distortion Analysis

  • Two opposing effects:
    1. Monopolist focuses on marginal vs average consumer (may underprovide quality)
    2. Monopolist serves higher θ types than social planner would (may overprovide quality)
  • Effects can go in opposite directions
  • Corollary: homogeneous population model gives optimal quality theorem
    • Marginal = average consumer
    • All-or-none sales decision
    • No scope for quality distortion

Durable Goods Monopoly

  • Goods provide services over multiple periods
  • Intuition: walk down demand curve over time, price discriminate by timing
  • High-value consumers buy early at high prices, low-value consumers wait for price drops

Two-Period Model with Commitment Power

  • Consumers buy at t=1 or t=2, then world ends
  • Consumer utility: 2θ - P₁ if buy at t=1, θ - P₂ if buy at t=2
  • Types θ distributed F(θ), marginal cost c

Optimal Policy with Commitment

  • Counterintuitive result: optimal to sell at monopoly price in period 1, make no sales in period 2
  • Constraint: θ₁ ≥ θ₂ (early buyers must have higher values)
  • If constraint non-binding, would get θ₂ > θ₁ (contradiction)
  • Reason: goods sold in period 1 have zero incremental cost (would produce for period 2 anyway)
  • Example: Apple iPhone pricing - constant price until new model
  • P₁ = θ₁ + θ₂, P₂ = θ₂ (early buyers pay premium for extra period of use)

Why Do We Observe Price Declines?

  • Different preferences (status from being first)
  • Changing costs over time (learning, capacity constraints, technology improvements)
  • Commitment problems

Commitment Problems

  • Without commitment, firm tempted to cut price in period 2
  • Forward-looking consumers anticipate this, won't buy in period 1
  • Numerical example: uniform demand, zero cost
    • With commitment: P = 1/2 both periods
    • Without commitment: P₁ = 9/10, P₂ = 3/10
    • Lower profits, decreasing price sequence

Coase Conjecture

  • Extreme commitment problem: continuous time, frequent price changes
  • Consumer utility: θe^(-rt) if purchase at time t
  • As Δt → 0, monopolist profits → 0
  • Monopolist essentially forced to marginal cost pricing
  • Reasoning: any finite price decline creates first-order gain from accelerating sales, second-order loss from price reduction
  • In limit, price must fall at infinite rate initially

Why Coase Conjecture Doesn't Hold

  • Firms don't change prices continuously (menu costs, consumer adjustment time)
  • Reputation effects
  • Inflow of new high-value customers
  • Non-rational/non-forward-looking consumers
  • Strategic responses: renting vs selling, most-favored-customer clauses, capacity constraints

Information Design in Monopoly Pricing

  • Recent active area in IO theory
  • Observation: some goods provide lots of information (laptops), others very little (mattresses, used cars)
  • Wholesale used car auctions: minimal information provided intentionally
  • Platform examples: Yelp, Amazon providing information about third-party products

Basic Framework

  • New product (Clover fried cauliflower sandwich)
  • Consumer values V ~ Uniform[0,18], marginal cost = $6
  • Three scenarios: full information, no information, partial information

Full Information Case

  • Standard monopoly pricing
  • Price = $12, 1/3 of consumers buy, profit = $2 per unit sold

No Information Case

  • Consumers know distribution but not own value
  • Expected value = $9 for all consumers
  • Price = $9, everyone buys, profit = $3 per unit sold
  • Higher profits by hiding product information
  • Creates inefficiency (low-value consumers buy) but eliminates monopoly deadweight loss
  • Transfers more surplus from consumers to monopolist

Partial Information Case (Platform Design)

  • Yelp provides partial information: "low value" (0-$6), "medium value" ($6-$14), "high value" ($14-$18)
  • Creates point masses in demand: 1/3 at $3, 4/9 at $10, 2/9 at $16
  • Monopolist prices at $10 (better than $16 due to demand structure)
  • Results in lower price than full information case ($10 vs $12)
  • Both consumer surplus and profits higher than monopoly case
  • Demonstrates how information design can benefit both parties

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