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Lecture 02: Monopoly Pricing and Durable Goods, Part 2

MIT OpenCourseWare

1h 21m 51s

Monopoly Information Design Theory Recap

  • Continuation from previous lecture on monopoly information design
  • Example: Clover sandwich with consumer values uniform on 0-18, cost $6
    • Full information: monopoly profit at price 12 (halfway between cost 6 and max value 18)
    • No information (bagged sandwich): all consumers value at 9, monopoly price 9, higher profits but zero consumer surplus
    • Partial information: monopoly price 10, both consumers and firm better off than full information
  • Practical implementation examples:
    • Omniscient firms (Amazon, Google, Apple) knowing consumer preferences better than consumers
    • Revealing partial product characteristics (e.g., cauliflower base ingredient)

General Information Design Framework

  • Russler and Zenus paper framework
  • Values distributed according to F on [0,1], zero cost, μ = mean consumer value
  • Firm chooses any joint distribution on V and s (signals)
  • Consumers willing to pay E[V|s] after receiving signal s
  • Constraints: E[s] = μ and F must be mean-preserving spread of signal distribution G

Profit vs Consumer Surplus Maximization

  • Profit maximization: Simple - tell consumers if value > C or < C, charge E[V|V>C], fully extract surplus
  • Consumer surplus maximization: More complex optimization problem
    • Goal: get everyone to buy at lowest possible price
    • Optimal distribution: concentrated mass at low values with flat section
    • Creates monopolist indifference over price range, forces low pricing

Empirical IO Historical Context

  • Pre-1960s: Industry-specific thick books, descriptive work, light on theory
  • 1960s-70s: Cross-section regressions across industries
    • Structure-conduct-performance literature
    • Markup = α₀ + α₁(four-firm concentration ratio) + α₂(advertising/sales ratio)
    • Used Census of Manufacturers data for 150+ industries
  • Critiques leading to decline:
    • Industry-specific factors omitted (750 variables for 150 observations)
    • Accounting vs economic costs measurement error
    • Endogeneity issues (profitable industries attract entry)

New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO)

  • 1980s revolution: Return to single-industry studies
  • Emphasis on well-measured variables (prices, quantities, market shares vs accounting data)
  • Heavy focus on identification and endogeneity
  • Theory-guided empirical work
  • Structural evolution: From equilibrium objects to primitive parameters estimation
  • Counterfactual policy simulations capability
  • Disconnect from theoretical models due to empirical constraints

Paper Topic Selection Strategies

  • Applied/policy questions with data search
  • Simple industries for complex model testing (cardboard boxes, ketchup)
  • Data-driven opportunities (startup connections, rich micro data)
  • Recent revival of "big questions" driven by macroeconomists

Textbook Market Study (Chevalier & Goolsbee)

  • Policy questions: Why $300 textbooks? Why frequent new editions making used books worthless?
  • Theoretical question: Are consumers forward-looking in durable goods markets?
  • Industry advantages:
    • Static purchase decisions (semester timing)
    • Limited substitution (assigned textbooks only)
    • No lemons problem (observable quality)
    • Large sample (subjects × semesters × textbooks)

Background Facts

  • New editions every 3-5 years
  • Fixed textbook prices (no decline over time despite rental value logic)
  • Used/new price ratio: 50-75% standardized
  • Buyback at 50% of cover price
  • Market shares: ~30% new, ~20% used, ~50% library/other
  • Hazard rate peaks at year 3 for revisions

Empirical Strategy

  • Step 1: Estimate revision probability using hazard model
    • Function of book age, subject (economics/psychology/biology), level
    • Peak probability ~35% at 5 semesters for economics books
  • Step 2: Test forward-looking behavior via demand response to revision probability

Demand Estimation

  • Discrete choice model: utility from new book, used book, no book
  • U(new) = X_jt β - α(P_jt - δμP_jt(1-death_prob)) + ε
  • Net price accounts for expected resale value discounted by δμ
  • Logit transformation: ln(share_new/share_none) = utility specification
  • IV for price: nonprofit publisher status, competitor concentration

Results

  • Estimated λ = δμ = 0.61
  • Given μ ∈ [0.4, 0.75], implies δ close to 1 (highly forward-looking consumers)
  • Strong demand response to revision probability
  • Amazon validation: used book prices drop dramatically when new edition announced

Media Bias Study (Gentzkow & Shapiro)

  • Research question: Profit-maximization vs ideological motivations for media bias
  • Setting: Newspaper industry (pre-internet era with multiple local papers)
  • Approach: Test optimal product quality theorem for news slant

Bias Measurement Innovation

  • Automated text processing of newspaper content
  • Identified 1000+ two/three-word phrases differentiating Democratic vs Republican speech patterns
  • Congressional speech analysis using Bush vote share in districts
  • Newspaper slant = coefficient from regressing phrase usage on Republican indicator
  • Examples: "Iraq war" vs "war on terror", "estate tax" vs "death tax"

Demand Model

  • Utility = average quality - γ(newspaper_slant - ideal_slant_z)² + ε
  • Ideal slant in zip code z = α + β(Republican_share_z)
  • Logit transformation to estimable form
  • Key interaction: slant × Republican_share coefficient identifies profit-maximizing relationship

Results

  • Strong positive relationship: right-slanted news sells better in Republican areas
  • Newspaper slant correlates with zip code Republican share
  • Owner effects analysis:
    • Owner fixed effects double R² (0.08 to 0.44)
    • But owner effects not significant when including state fixed effects
    • Owner political contributions explain only 5% variance vs 20% for zip code politics
  • Conclusion: Profit-maximization appears to dominate ideological motivations

Methodological Concerns

  • Heroic assumptions: no heterogeneity within zip codes, no error in ideal slant equation
  • Phrase selection may capture non-political content (agriculture vs urban topics)
  • Strong functional form assumptions for profit-maximization claims

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