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Lecture 16: Land Markets (Part 1)

MIT OpenCourseWare

1h 21m 22s

Course Introduction and Overview

  • Land markets lecture covering two broad themes:
    • Allocation of land and moral hazard/sharecropping issues
    • Property rights and investment decisions (covered Monday)
  • Focus on basic theory first, then applications

Historical Context of Sharecropping

  • Very old subject, studied by economists like Smith and Marshall
  • Sharecropping is ubiquitous - laborers pay owners share of output
  • Recognized inefficiency: workers don't get full returns to labor
  • Basic issue: reduced work incentives when sharing output with landlord

Basic Sharecropping Model

  • Output: f(I) where I is input
  • Tenant pays cost C for labor/inputs
  • Owner receives share α of output
  • Tenant's first order condition: marginal product = marginal cost/(1-α)
  • Key insight: distortion from taxing output, not profits
  • If taxed profits instead of output, no distortion would occur
  • Problem: output more observable than profits (especially for self-employed farmers)

Rental Contract Solution

  • Optimal solution: tenant rents land for fixed rent r, keeps all output
  • Tenant maximizes F(I) - C(I) - r
  • Fixed rent r doesn't affect input decisions (lump sum)
  • Achieves first best efficiency
  • Question: why doesn't this happen in practice?

Reasons Rental Contracts Don't Emerge

Risk Aversion and Insurance (Stiglitz Model)

  • Trade-off between incentives and risk sharing
  • Rental contract: tenant bears all risk, landlord gets fixed fee
  • Typically poor tenant vs. rich landlord
  • Optimal risk sharing requires both parties to share some risk
  • Results in sharecropping-type contracts for insurance purposes

Detailed Risk Aversion Model

  • Two-state model: high output (H) and low output (0)
  • Effort e determines probability of high state
  • Cost of effort: ½ce²
  • Landlord sets payments h (high state) and l (low state)
  • First best effort: e = H/C
  • Rental contract requires h - l = H for first best
  • With risk aversion: utility less than certainty equivalent
  • Optimal contract involves some insurance (h - l < H)
  • Second-order efficiency loss vs. first-order utility gain from insurance

Limited Liability Model

  • Constraint: l ≥ 0 (can't force negative payments)
  • When first best requires l < 0, constraint binds
  • Optimal solution: l = 0, h = H/2
  • Results in effort = H/2C (half of first best)
  • Generates 50-50 sharecropping contract naturally
  • May give tenant rents if utility exceeds outside option

Land Reform Implications

  • Risk aversion model: sharecropping might re-emerge after land reform
    • Tenants still want insurance, might sell back to landlords
  • Limited liability model: land reform solves problem
    • No need to pay rent, so limited liability constraint disappears
  • Different models have very different policy implications

Empirical Challenges

  • Difficult to test sharecropping theory with observational data
  • Problem: farmers choosing different contracts may differ systematically
  • Land quality differences between owned vs. sharecropped plots
  • Potential solution: farmers with multiple plots (some owned, some sharecropped)
  • Still challenges with unobservable plot characteristics

Bandiera et al. Uganda Experiment

Experimental Design

  • Randomized controlled trial with tenant farmers in Uganda
  • Three treatments:
    • Baseline: keep 50% of output
    • Treatment 1: keep 75% of output
    • Treatment 2: keep 50% of output plus exogenous cash transfer (25% of expected output)
    • Treatment 3: keep 50% of output plus risky cash transfer

Key Results

  • Strong response to 75% vs. 50% contract
  • Minimal response to cash transfer treatments
  • Confirms incentive effects rather than pure income effects
  • Effects on:
    • Intensive margin of capital usage
    • Unpaid family labor
    • Crop choice (shift from safer beans to riskier maize/tomatoes)

Methodological Issues

  • Randomization inference used due to small sample
  • External validity questions (unusual setting with women's groups)
  • Risk treatment not perfectly analogous to production risk
  • Crop choice effects puzzling (most observable/contractible margin)

Policy Implications Discussion

  • Paper establishes efficiency consequences of sharecropping
  • Doesn't resolve why sharecropping emerges endogenously
  • Different underlying causes (risk vs. limited liability) suggest different solutions:
    • If risk aversion: agricultural insurance based on weather/exogenous shocks
    • If limited liability: transfers or debt contracts
  • Challenge: basis risk in weather insurance (imperfect correlation with actual losses)

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