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Lecture 5: The Kilian-Micali Protocol, Part 1

MIT OpenCourseWare

1h 44m 35s

Recap of Previous Lectures

  • Last week was crypto day, missed previous session
  • Two weeks ago: discussed using GKR protocol to construct PCPs (Probabilistically Checkable Proofs)
  • PCP concept: take NP language proof/witness, extend it (make longer), but verify by reading only few locations
  • Construction approach: convert NP problem to 3-SAT, use GKR protocol on low-depth circuit checking satisfying assignment

PCP Construction from GKR Protocol

  • Take 3-SAT instance, create circuit C_φ that checks if assignment satisfies formula
  • Circuit has low depth (log depth for 3-SAT)
  • Generate PCP by running GKR protocol "in head" on this circuit
  • Write down all possible prover messages for every verifier query
  • Include low-degree extension of witness in PCP
  • Results in large PCP but verifiable with polylog queries

Soundness Issues with Basic PCP Construction

  • Problem: malicious prover might not provide valid low-degree extension
  • If prover gives high-degree function instead of low-degree extension, soundness breaks
  • Solution: add low-degree test to verify witness extension has low degree
  • Low-degree test checks if function is close to low-degree (agrees on 1-ε fraction of points)

Transition to Computational Soundness

  • Moving from information-theoretic to computational security
  • Interactive Arguments: computationally sound proof systems
  • Security parameter λ governs computational assumptions
  • Soundness only against polynomial-time (or T(λ)-time) adversaries
  • Completeness: honest prover with witness convinces verifier with probability 1
  • Computational Soundness: any poly(λ)-size cheating prover succeeds with negligible probability

Security Parameter Considerations

  • Challenge: if λ = polylog(n), cheating prover limited to polylog(n) time
  • May seem too weak since can't even read input of size n
  • Solutions:
    • Set λ = n^ε for small ε > 0
    • Use stronger cryptographic assumptions (subexponential security)
    • Assume adversaries bounded by 2^(λ^ε) rather than poly(λ)

Collision-Resistant Hash Functions with Local Opening

  • Five algorithms: Gen, Eval, Open, Verify
  • Gen(1^λ): generates hash key HK
  • Eval(HK, X): outputs hash value V ∈ {0,1}^λ for arbitrary-length input X
  • Open(HK, X, i): outputs bit b = X_i and opening π of size poly(λ)
  • Verify(HK, V, i, b, π): accepts/rejects opening
  • Correctness: honest openings always verify
  • Collision Resistance: adversary cannot open same position to both 0 and 1

Kilian-Micali Protocol Construction

  • Succinct interactive argument for NP using PCP + collision-resistant hash with local opening
  • Protocol steps:
    1. Verifier generates hash key HK, sends to prover
    2. Prover computes PCP, sends V = Eval(HK, PCP)
    3. Verifier runs PCP verifier, generates queries i₁,...,iₗ
    4. Prover opens PCP at queried locations: sends PCP[i₁],...,PCP[iₗ] with openings
    5. Verifier checks PCP verification and all openings

Communication Complexity

  • Hash value: λ bits
  • Query indices: polylog bits each
  • PCP values and openings: poly(λ) bits total
  • Total communication: poly(λ) (independent of input size n)
  • Verifier runtime: linear in input size (must read instance) + poly(λ) for verification

Completeness Analysis

  • Straightforward: honest prover with valid witness
  • PCP has perfect completeness
  • Hash function has perfect correctness
  • Overall protocol has perfect completeness

Soundness Analysis Approach

  • Assume cheating prover P* succeeds with probability ε ≥ 1/poly(λ)
  • Construct adversary A that breaks collision resistance
  • A runs P* many times with same hash value but different queries
  • Two cases:
    1. Find collision (same position opened to 0 and 1) → break hash function
    2. No collisions → can reconstruct accepting PCP for false statement → contradiction

Soundness Proof Issues

  • Rewinding necessary: must run cheating prover multiple times
  • Runtime concern: adversary A runs in time poly(n) · poly(1/ε)
  • Only works if T(λ) ≥ n (security parameter assumption strength)
  • Alternative: Barak-Goldreich 2002 proof avoids full PCP reconstruction

Homework Assignment Details

  • Due date moved from after Thanksgiving to before (this weekend)
  • Will include low-degree testing component
  • Attack construction against unsound PCP variant
  • Extension available upon request

Technical Implementation Notes

  • PCP verifier queries can be sent as randomness rather than explicit indices
  • Enables later non-interactive conversion via Fiat-Shamir paradigm
  • First message (hash key) need not be random, later messages should be random
  • Practical implementations often commit only to witness, then run interactive GKR

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