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Lecture 9: BARGs Implies SNARGs and Connection to Non-Signaling PCPs, Part 1

MIT OpenCourseWare

1h 27m 27s

Course Conclusion & Overview

  • Last class of cryptography course before break
  • Cookies provided to make final class "sweet"
  • Goal: construct SNARKs (Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge) using building blocks developed throughout course
  • Entire course was buildup to SNARK construction

BARG Review (Batch Arguments)

  • Definition: prove many instances belong to NP language
  • Three algorithms: Gen, Prov, Ver
  • Gen: takes security parameter λ (unary), K instances (binary), N instance length (binary)
    • Outputs CRS
    • Runs in poly(λ) but poly log K, poly log N
  • Prov: takes CRS, X₁...Xₖ with witnesses
    • Outputs proof π of size poly(λ) + log K (succinct - depends only logarithmically on K)
  • Ver: takes CRS, instances, proof → outputs 0/1

BARG Properties

  • Completeness: valid witnesses generate accepting BARGs with probability 1
  • Soundness: cheating prover cannot convince of false statement
    • Semi-adaptive soundness: adversary commits to cheating location i before seeing CRS
    • For any poly-size P, any i: probability P outputs X₁...Xₖ, π where Xᵢ ∉ L and π accepted is negligible
  • Index Languages: if X₁...Xₖ have succinct description (machine M where Xᵢ = M(i)), verifier runtime grows with |M|, not K

Somewhere Extractable Hash Functions

  • Five PPT algorithms: Gen, Eval, Open, Ver, Extract
  • Gen: takes λ, n (input length), i (binding location) → outputs hash key HK, trapdoor TD
  • Eval: takes HK, X ∈ {0,1}ⁿ → outputs hash value V
  • Open: takes HK, X, index j → outputs opening ρⱼ
  • Ver: takes HK, V, j, bit b, opening ρⱼ → outputs 0/1
  • Extract: takes TD, V → outputs bit Xᵢ

Properties

  • Completeness: honest openings always verify, extract outputs correct bit
  • Index Hiding: hash keys for different indices are computationally indistinguishable
  • Somewhere Statistically Binding (SSB): even all-powerful adversary cannot open location i to both 0 and 1
    • Binding extends to all locations j computationally due to index hiding
  • Multiple Locations: can bind on L locations by generating L hash keys, repeating L times
    • Even revealing some trapdoors keeps other indices hidden

Construction Details - Somewhere Extractable Hash

  • Based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
  • Basic idea (doesn't work): Gen outputs encryption of index i, trapdoor is secret key
  • Issue: malicious adversaries can provide garbage ciphertexts, breaking binding
  • Solution: Use n public keys (one per layer), encrypt both iⱼ and secret key skⱼ₋₁
  • Evaluation: decrypt both children, choose relevant one based on encrypted bit, re-encrypt
  • Key insight: even if sibling ciphertexts are malformed, path ciphertexts remain well-formed through decryption process

SNARK Construction

Ingredients

  • BARG (batch argument system)
  • Somewhere extractable hash function

Algorithms

Gen(1^λ, n):

  • Generate hash key HK for somewhere extractable hash
    • Parameters: λ, number of wires in circuit C, binding locations i₁...iₗ
  • Generate CRS_BARG for BARG
    • Parameters: λ, K = number of gates in C, n' = statement length
  • Output CRS = (HK, CRS_BARG)

Prover(CRS, X, witness):

  • Compute all wire values W₁...Wₙ in verification circuit C (excluding input X)
  • Compute hash value V = Eval(HK, W₁...Wₙ)
  • Generate BARG proof π_BARG for K statements:
    • For each gate j: prove existence of valid openings to input/output wires satisfying gate constraints
    • Statement Xⱼ* = (HK, V, j)
    • Witness Wⱼ* = (left_bit, right_bit, output_bit, ρ_left, ρ_right, ρ_output)
  • Output π = (V, π_BARG)

Verifier(CRS, X, π):

  • Parse π = (V, π_BARG)
  • Run V_BARG(CRS_BARG, X₁...Xₖ, π_BARG) where Xⱼ* = (HK, V, j)
  • Accept iff BARG verifies

Efficiency

  • SNARK size: |V| + |π_BARG| = poly(λ) + L·poly(λ) + polylog(K)
  • Verifier runtime: polylog(K) + |X| (due to index language property)
  • L should ideally be polylog(K) for optimal succinctness

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