AI summary by TwinMind
My browser got hacked and it cost me $2,000
Theo - t3․gg
21m 40s
Arc Browser Overview & Initial Analysis
- Arc browser requires account to use, uses Chrome base with different workflow
- Eva (security researcher) discovered critical vulnerability allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution
- Initial analysis revealed Arc using Firebase for authentication and data storage
- Eva used man-in-the-middle proxy and Frida script to analyze Firebase requests
Firebase vs Traditional API Architecture
- Traditional API: User → Server → Database with server-side validation/authorization
- Firebase model: User directly accesses database with permission rules
- Firebase eliminates server-side code but relies heavily on proper security rule configuration
- Default Firebase configurations often insecure, requiring manual permission restrictions
Arc Boosts Feature Vulnerability
- Arc Boosts allow users to customize websites with CSS/JavaScript injection
- Boosts stored in Firebase Firestore with Creator ID field linking to user
- Critical flaw: Creator ID field was updatable by users
- Security rule only applied to updates, not creation of boosts
- Users could create boost with arbitrary Creator ID, then update it
Exploit Chain Discovery
- Eva created test boost for Google with JavaScript payload
- Successfully updated Creator ID to different user's ID
- Once Creator ID changed, original user lost access to boost
- Exploit required target's user ID, obtainable through:
- Referral links (contain user data)
- Published boosts (display user ID)
- Easel whiteboards (expose user ID)
- Boost snapshots on public site
Attack Vector & Impact
- Attacker obtains target's user ID through various public sources
- Creates malicious boost with JavaScript payload on their own account
- Updates Creator ID to target's ID
- When target visits specified website, malicious code executes in their browser
- Could run on Chrome settings pages, potentially compromising permissions
- Complete remote code execution without target visiting malicious site
Initial Response & Bounty Issues
- Vulnerability reported August 25th to Arc co-founder
- Patched within 24 hours of contact
- Initial bounty: $2,000 (widely criticized as insufficient)
- CVE assigned 2 weeks later
- Public criticism of low bounty amount for critical vulnerability
Arc's Improved Response
- Increased bounty to $20,000 after public pressure
- Offered Eva job at Browser Company
- Published detailed incident breakdown
- Confirmed no actual users affected (only researcher's test cases)
- Analysis of Firebase access logs showed no malicious exploitation
Remediation & Future Security
- Arc conducting internal audit of all Firebase ACL rules
- Moving away from Firebase for new features
- Implementing external security audits
- Establishing formal bug bounty program
- Addressing privacy concerns about URL tracking
- Stricter field update permissions being implemented
Technical Details
- Firebase Firestore collection: "boosts" with Creator ID field
- Query:
firestore.collection('boosts').where('creatorId', '==', userId) - Problem: Creator ID field not marked as immutable like created_at timestamps
- Solution: Restrict Creator ID updates, proper field-level permissions
