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Russia’s Mysterious New Nuclear Torpedo: What We Know | WSJ Equipped
The Wall Street Journal
6m 11s
Poseidon Weapon System Overview
- Russia testing new nuclear torpedo called Poseidon
- Massive torpedo in development for at least a decade
- Designed to target coastal cities and military bases in US and NATO countries
- Goal: demonstrate Russia remains first-class nuclear power
- Weapon shrouded in misinformation since Putin's announcement
Nuclear Weapons Technology Context
- Nuclear weapons technology largely not new
- Traditional delivery methods: gravity bombs, ballistic missiles
- 2018: Putin unveiled plans for nuclear weapons on modern delivery systems
- Poseidon among new systems announced
- Will be equipped on submarines similar to current ballistic missile systems
Technical Specifications and Capabilities
- Russia calls it unmanned underwater vehicle/drone
- Portrayed as able to:
- Guide itself around obstacles
- Evade enemy countermeasures
- Reach great depths and high speeds
- Pentagon 2018 nuclear posture: refers to it as autonomous torpedo
- Nuclear researcher assessment: likely has advanced homing/guidance systems
- Can avoid some countermeasures
- Cannot perform complex maneuverability
- Dual-capable: conventional or nuclear warhead
Warhead Yield Specifications
- Unknown exact yield of warhead
- US's largest nuke: B83 at 1.2 megatons
- Initial Russian media reports: up to 100 megatons
- Recent Russian media reports: 2 megatons
- Expert assessment: no strategic reason for 100-megaton warhead
- 2-megaton warhead comparison:
- 95 times larger than Nagasaki bomb
- 133 times larger than Hiroshima bomb
- Orders of magnitude larger destruction potential
Underwater Detonation Effects
- Designed to detonate underwater
- Exact impact unknown
- Russian suggestions: could create tsunami with 10,000-foot waves
- Competing reports: not how tsunamis work, wouldn't have that effect
- Tsunami discussion feeds Russian narrative about catastrophic effects for deterrence
Defense System Circumvention
- Russia claims designed to circumvent all missile defense systems
- No current defense system can cope with subsurface vehicles
- Expert analysis: US missile defense not designed to stop Russia's existing arsenal
- Russian claims about developing due to Western missile defense either:
- Overly optimistic about US capabilities
- Disingenuous
Strategic Classification and Use Doctrine
- Congressional report: Russia views as second-strike weapon
- Analyst assessment: potential first-strike weapon capabilities
- Russia stated: prepared to use nuclear weapons first if NATO attacks Russia directly
- Would give Russian leadership option for first-strike capability
Historical and Strategic Context
- Development began before Ukraine invasion
- Used to project power when conventional forces weakened
- Soviet Union collapse precedent:
- Conventional forces greatly weakened
- Changed nuclear doctrine around this time
- Increased reliance on nuclear weapons
- Consider first-use scenarios to compensate conventional inferiority
- Putin's main military fear: NATO's conventional superiority
Current Development Status
- Federation of American Scientists: Russia constructing storage facilities for warheads and submarines
- Recent Putin speech: tests being completed
- Unclear what testing stage weapon has reached
- 2022: Russia abandoned planned test without explanation
Development Challenges and Limitations
- Russian weapon capability claims vs. actual performance rarely intersect
- Strategy: make everyone think about nuclear war possibility and arms race
- Exaggerating capabilities
- Recent setbacks with new weapon systems
- Continuing challenges:
- Resource constraints
- Technology inferior to Western capabilities
- Ukraine war sanctions constrained component acquisition
Strategic Implications
- Poseidon's future uncertain
- Cold War end: nuclear weapons left public consciousness
- Putin brought nuclear weapons back to prominence
- Poseidon example of this strategy
- Important to differentiate between reality and Putin's facade
