AI summary by TwinMind

S3 Is A Security Nightmare (Common Exploit Showcase)

Theo - t3․gg

16m 47s

S3 Security Issues Introduction

  • Video about S3 security flaws, configuration issues causing massive security vulnerabilities
  • February blog post discovery led to video content planning
  • Community member Eva conducted extensive S3 exploit research
  • Reference to previous Firebase exploit: 900 sites, 125 million accounts, $4 billion potential bank credentials

Pre-signed Post URL Explanation

  • Traditional file upload: user → server → S3 (double bandwidth cost)
  • Pre-signed post URL allows direct upload: user → S3 (eliminates ingress/egress costs)
  • Process flow:
    • User requests permission to upload
    • Server generates pre-signed post URL with specific permissions, time window, file delimiters
    • User uploads directly to S3 using URL
  • Benefits: eliminated bandwidth costs, reduced latency
  • Drawbacks: many configuration mistakes possible

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerability

  • Companies create subdomains like files.company.com or cdn.company.com for S3
  • Poor content type handling allows HTML file uploads
  • Improperly set cookies enable account takeover
  • HTML/JavaScript served from specific URL has access to domain cookies
  • If cookies work on subdomains (files.google.com + google.com), HTML pages can access credentials
  • Cross-site scripting = one of scariest exploit methods

Tally Case Study - XSS Exploit

  • Tally: modern Google Forms alternative with image support, profile pictures
  • Custom endpoint uploads files to S3 after performing checks
  • Request example: API.tso upload block asset
  • Response: pixel image, name, URL storage.t.o, image pink pixel.PNG, size 83 bytes
  • HTML file upload attempt: hello image source X on error alert one
  • Successfully posted XSS HTML as asset with correct MIME type
  • Browser MIME sniffing: browsers try to detect HTML even with different content type headers
  • Tally sanitized XSS payload but not foolproof
  • SVG XML exploit: xmlns W3.org forcing XML parsing mode
  • Successful cross-site scripting on files.t.o with session cookie in scope (HTTP only)

Authentication Token Extraction

  • Tally endpoint allows authentication token retrieval from refresh cookie
  • Final payload: refetch page with credentials, await fetch attacker callback
  • Full user information dump when clicking SVG link
  • Window.location.replace cleanup to appear like normal homepage visit
  • Result: one-click full account compromise
  • No bounty awarded (startup), but issue fixed quickly

Path Control Vulnerability

  • Services allowing user control of file path/key during upload
  • Problem: server doesn't check if file already exists
  • Allows client to override other users' files
  • Common issue across most services

P Case Study - File Override

  • P: donation page platform for streamers with team splitting
  • Channel banners, profile pictures stored on S3
  • Request: API.pg.v10 upload sign ACL public read, key for file, file types image PNG
  • Key randomly generated by client
  • Changing key to existing user's file allows override
  • Successfully changed Thor's profile picture to gnome for one minute
  • Classic case of insecured S3 uploads

Upload Thing Solution

  • Built specifically to solve file upload problems
  • Common issues: incorrect implementation, eating unnecessary bandwidth costs, improper authentication, allowing unauthorized uploads, incorrect naming
  • Upload Thing features:
    • Generated keys prevent file override
    • URLs contain key + file extension
    • File names stored separately from URL
    • Authentication required on user's server
    • Enforces security patterns by default
  • Setup time: literal minutes, some users under 10 seconds
  • Speedrun record: 9 seconds 245 milliseconds using bash history shortcuts
  • Requires user authentication management on own server
  • Drag and drop functionality

Security Recommendations

  • Set cookies properly
  • Don't allow user control of file keys
  • Avoid client-side ACL setting
  • Use third-party solutions carefully due to common implementation errors
  • S3 documentation lacks clarity, amplifying issues

Alternative Solutions Listed

  • Upload Thing (primary recommendation)
  • B scale file upload API
  • File stack
  • Simple file uploader with transform/delivery APIs

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