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The Early Years at TSMC

Asianometry

16m 37s

TSMC's Founding and Initial Investment (1987)

  • TSMC opened February 1987 with factory and staff from Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute
  • Taiwanese government invested ~$100 million at start
  • Founder Dr. Morris Chang: government never invested another dollar after initial funding
  • New unproven business model: only semiconductor company solely dedicated to manufacturing
  • No existing market for foundry services at founding

Historical Context and Precedents

  • Custom chip concept not original to TSMC
  • Fairchild Semiconductor 1960s: micro mosaic logic chip with ~150 logic gates
    • Aluminum interconnects customized at end of fabbing process
    • Used computer for placement and routing (casually invented electronic design automation)
  • LSI Logic founded by Fairchild team members for custom chips
    • Jensen Huang worked at LSI Logic before founding Nvidia
  • March 1976: Morris Chang proposed foundry idea to Texas Instruments
    • Suggested TI aggregate outside customer demand to strengthen manufacturing capability
    • TI rejected idea - made no sense to open fabs to potential competitors
    • TI went opposite direction: started making consumer electronics (competing with own customers)

Critical Technological Foundation

  • Morris Chang: foundry concept impossible without Carver Mead and Lynn Conway's revolutionary work
  • Their contributions: abstraction hierarchies, systems/subsystems approach, common block reuse
  • Enabled splitting of chip design from manufacturing

Early Leadership Structure

  • Morris Chang: Chairman (not CEO initially)
    • Asian companies: chairman more active role, corporate affairs representative, not daily operations
  • James E. Dykes: First CEO (March 1987)
    • Background: General Electric VP, managed all GE semiconductor work
    • Integrated RCA factories after GE 1985 acquisition
    • After 2 years closing RCA factories, was "put out to pasture"
    • Taiwan government wanted foreign investor and executive
    • Initially refused Chang's offer, convinced after in-person meeting in North Carolina
    • Oversaw construction of first actual fab (Fab 2)
    • Completed contract, returned to US
    • Died Florida 2013, age 75, remembered for kindness and love of hamburgers

Early Survival Strategy (1987-1991)

  • No fabless industry existed yet
  • Most people didn't care about "newfangled company" in "backwards Taiwan"
  • Survived by providing extra capacity in trailing edge products
  • First customer likely Intel (Morris Chang knew Robert Noyce, Gordon Moore)

Intel Partnership Development (1988)

  • Andy Grove visited Taiwan to see Fab 1 and 3-micrometer node
  • Chang showed good yields on 3-micron technology (2.5 generations behind Intel/TI)
  • Grove impressed, said "maybe Intel can use you"
  • Taiwan fabs had superior yields since RCA technology transfer days
  • Intel accreditation phase: found 200 issues, TSMC resolved one by one
  • Certified to produce processors and Intel chipsets
  • Other American IDMs struck deals for popular products lacking capacity
  • TI-TSMC 256k dynamic RAM production deal 1988 (leading edge was 1 megabit)

Fab 1 Operations and Innovation

  • Capacity: ~1,200 150mm wafers/month
  • Emoji sticker system for equipment status:
    • Smiling: machine working fine, actively used
    • Sleeping: working fine, not currently used (not making money)
    • Hurt face: down for repair, needs attention
    • Skeptical (raised eyebrow): not right, engineer should investigate
  • Goal: all machines showing happy sticker
  • Psychological gaming to address non-smiley stickers immediately

Fab 2 Development (1990)

  • Dedicated 1990
  • 500 nanometer node
  • Capacity: 3,000-4,000 150mm wafers/month
  • Fab 1 closed 2001 (only fab TSMC ever closed)
  • Technically correct claim of never closing fab since they didn't build Fab 1

Manufacturing Secret: Cycle Time Focus

  • Cycle time: duration for wafer lot (25+ wafers) through entire fabrication (600-1000 steps)
  • 1989 Dykes interview: plan to outmanufacture Japanese
    • Target: 20-25 days input to output
    • Much faster than Japanese (promised 40 days, actually ran 55 days)
    • Japanese weakness: cycle time
  • Peter Thiel concept: every great business built around hidden secret
  • TSMC's secret: cycle time focus equal to yield focus
  • Shorter cycle time = faster wafer processing = faster yield learning
  • 1998 Morris Chang handwrote top priorities: "short cycle time from wafer start to finish" (#4 priority)

Competitive Advantages vs Japanese (Early 1990s)

  • Japanese had capacity and technology for foundry services
  • Example: Xilinx fabbed first products at Seiko Corporation
  • Japanese demanded concessions:
    • Seiko got exclusivity in Japan market for Xilinx products
    • Wanted product information about chips being fabbed
  • TSMC position (Dykes): don't compete with customers, no incentive to steal designs
  • Unlike TI or Japanese, TSMC enshrined non-compete value in company charter

Leadership Transition: Don Brooks Era (1991-1997)

  • Don Brooks: third president, replaced Klaus Weimer (who went to Chartered Semiconductor Singapore)
  • Background: 22 years at TI, associate of Morris Chang
  • Called Chang "one of top semiconductor managers in 70s and 80s"
  • Praised Asian talent pool: "trained loyal workforce and financial means"
  • Taiwan described as "homogeneous, like US 1950s, team effort"
  • Social pressure: if one person doesn't pull weight, jeopardizes others' bonuses/profit sharing

Workforce Economics and Quality

  • Lower base salaries allowed 2x more engineers per task vs West
  • Later: engineers/workers in profit sharing earned TSMC stock worth hundreds of thousands annually
  • Low wages not primary advantage (China fabs didn't have superior economics)
  • Quality, retention, education critical factors
  • Talent pool: two top Taiwan universities nearby, graduates fed into TSMC
  • 1987: 32,000 of 130,000 foreigners getting advanced US degrees were from Taiwan
  • Taiwanese familiar with West, spoke passable English

Industry Transformation (1991+)

  • Rise of fabless industry
  • Semiconductor fabs increasingly expensive: new line cost $200 million
  • Squeezed startups and middle-class semiconductor makers ($100M-$1B revenue)
  • Adding new line risked overcapacity
  • Foundry model: always able to tap capacity interested in customer success
  • Prestigious customers (Intel, TI) brought Taiwanese design houses to TSMC
  • Design houses: small companies, little capital, plenty of chip ideas (video games to computers)
  • Fabless industry growth (Taiwan, then US) fueled TSMC better than second-source supplier role

Morris Chang's Initial Skepticism

  • Brooks and Dykes compelled by foundry idea from beginning
  • Morris Chang most negative despite recruiting them
  • 1991 Brooks joining: Chang said building Fab 2 but "wouldn't anticipate Fab 3, don't get your hopes up"
  • Brooks: "when he speaks of being visionary, I don't think he had any idea what he was getting started"
  • Chang still working at Industrial Technology Research Institute until 1994
  • Also chairman of Vanguard Semiconductor (another foundry) until 2003
  • Saw TSMC only once monthly, not involved in day-to-day operations

Brooks' Vision and Results

  • Saw incredible yields at fabs and economic power of scaling
  • American semiconductor industry experience: understood customer pains
  • Ignored Chang's pessimism, got to work
  • TSMC grew 54% annually during Brooks' 6-year presidency
  • Chang's conservative nature: "always told me business was going to crap out, you're over investing"
  • "But he didn't get in my way when it came down to doing it"
  • Chang surprised by success in 95-96, seized opportunity to become president for rewards

Brooks' Departure and Aftermath

  • Wanted to return to US, originally supposed to work at US office
  • Chang changed mind, Brooks resigned
  • Joined TSMC rival UMC, "ruffled feathers" with old colleagues
  • Died Texas 2013, age 74
  • Recalled departure with "wistful bitterness"

Philosophical Reflection

  • Morris Chang read Ecclesiastes 9:11 at Harvard
  • "Race is not to the swift or battle to the strong... but time and chance happened to them all"
  • Business histories make TSMC seem like overnight success
  • Reality: Chang founded TSMC on just one idea among many
  • Taiwan already becoming successful semiconductor power
  • Success relied on mix of hard-working Taiwanese, American-educated Taiwanese, foreign semiconductor veterans
  • Climbed value chain, carved out brand new industry niche
  • "Time and chance happens to us all - TSMC came at right time, had right chance, made most of it"

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