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The Fall of Neptune Orient Lines: Singapore's National Shipping Company

Asianometry

19m 37s

NOL Founding and Early Years (1968-1970s)

  • December 2015: Temasek agreed to sell NOL shares to French shipping line CMA CGM for $2.4 billion
  • Board unanimously approved transaction
  • NOL founded 1968 as Singapore's national shipping line, 3 years after country's 1965 founding
  • Wholly owned by Singaporean government, guided by finance minister Dr. Goh Keng Swee
  • 1969: Bought first two ships
    • Neptune Topaz (18 years old) from German company Hansa
    • Neptune Taurus tanker from Worldwide Shipping Group
  • Early struggles: 5-ship fleet much smaller than competitors, staff lacked experience
  • Clashed with Far East Freight Conference (FEFC) - Asian-European cartel controlling Europe-Asia shipping routes and freight rates
  • 1969: Government converted loans to equity, transferred shares to Temasek Holdings

Container Business Success and First Profits (1970s-1980s)

  • 1970s: Moved into container business, modernized fleet
  • Under leadership of future PM Goh Chok Tong, turned first profit in 1975
  • Joined shipping conferences to Australia, gained market share
  • 1980s: Became first Singaporean government company to go public on Singapore Stock Exchange
  • Raised $155 million, Temasek progressively sold down holdings but retained high 20s percentage stake

Industry Deregulation and Competitive Pressures (1980s-1990s)

  • 1980s: Evergreen Marine opened fully containerized Asia-Europe service, broke century-old FEFC
  • Combined with anti-trust scrutiny, shipping conferences lost influence, industry deregulated
  • Competition increased, companies expanded horizontally (bigger ships, acquisitions) and vertically (logistics)
  • Ship economies of scale: 12,000 TEU ship 11% more cost efficient than 8,000 TEU, 23% better than 4,000 TEU
  • NOL sought acquisition for economies of scale

APL Acquisition and Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1999)

  • 1997: NOL bid to acquire 150-year-old American President Lines (APL) for $825 million
    • Biggest acquisition ever by Singaporean company
    • APL owned 10% of Asian-North American container business
    • Combined company: 113 ships (80 container style), $4 billion revenues
    • Strategic access to US logistics, railway links, terminals
  • 1998: Asian financial crisis hit shipping industry
  • 1997-1998: NOL lost $460 million, debt swelled to over $4 billion
  • CEO Lua Cheng Eng vacated position 1999, remained chairman

Fleming Jacobs Turnaround (1999-2003)

  • Fleming Jacobs (former Maersk executive) became new CEO 1999
  • Shocked industry - outsider from world's biggest shipping company
  • Restructuring measures:
    • Issued $500 million equity shares, diluting shareholders to pay debt
    • Sold APL Rail subsidiary Stack Train to Pacer International for $315 million
    • Let go over 1,000 employees (10% of company)
    • Brought Westerners into upper ranks ("joke: NOL = No Orientals Left")
  • 2000: Company turned $178 million profit as trans-Pacific rates rebounded
  • Expanded into third-party logistics, divested tanker businesses
  • 2001: Established APL Logistics, paid $210 million for GATX Logistics
    • Boosted APL Logistics revenues 70%, gained 21 million sq ft warehouse space
  • September 11, 2001: Industry plunged into downturn
  • 2002 H1: Lost $151 million despite shipping volumes increasing
  • 2001: Closed with $57 million loss
  • 2003: Jacobs lost CEO job, received $2.5 million severance

Recovery and Temasek Buyout (2004-2007)

  • 2003-2004: Economic growth, US export demand surged, trans-Pacific rates increased
  • 2004: Record $429 million profit
  • Issued another $300 million equity
  • Temasek increased stake from high 20s to 53.5%
  • Pattern: Two major financial crises in 5 years, both leading to losses and leadership changes, followed by quick turnarounds

Structural Problems and Capital Shortage

  • NOL positioned as premium legacy operator charging premium prices
  • Constantly suffered capital shortage - ships require large upfront cash
  • 2004-2007: Did not sell equity to raise cash (would dilute shareholders including Temasek)
  • Could not invest in larger, more profitable ships
  • Chartered other people's ships rather than building own fleet

2008 Financial Crisis Impact (2008-2012)

  • 2008: Financial crisis struck, container demand crashed
  • Demand dropped 6 points 2007-2008, another 15 points 2008-2009
  • Container freight rates dropped 33%
  • Industry losses: Maersk lost $2.1 billion, Hanjin lost $1.1 billion, NOL lost $700 million
  • NOL diluted shareholders in $1 billion share raise
  • Liner shares crashed over 60% from 2007 peak
  • Same cost structure as boom years due to locked-in charter rates
  • CEO Thomas Held lost job after losses and botched Hapag Lloyd acquisition bid
  • 2010: Brief resurgence, small profit
  • Next 4 years: Continued losses, could not buy new bigger ships when prices were cheap

Final Years and Sale Preparation (2011-2015)

  • 2011: Leading liners ordered 20,000+ TEU ships
  • 2015: Evergreen bought 11 ships for $35 million less each than Maersk paid in 2011
  • NOL cut costs by returning chartered ships, giving up market share for profitability
  • Over 60% of shipping costs are fixed, business about economies of scale
  • Stock removed from benchmark Straits Times Index
  • 2015: Positioned for sale
    • Sold APL Logistics to Japan's Kintetsu World Express for $1.2 billion (February)
    • Cut order book to nothing - only top 10 shipping line without pipeline of new ships
    • Slimmed down business for easier acquirer integration

CMA CGM Acquisition (December 2015)

  • December 2015: Sold to French operator CMA CGM for $2.4 billion
  • Price slight discount to ~$3 billion book value, considering operating losses but valuing Asian-US routes
  • CMA agreed to move 1/3 of traffic from Malaysia to Singapore
  • Relocated regional headquarters from Hong Kong to Singapore
  • Q1 2017: NOL turned $26 million profit (first since 2011)
    • Core liner division showing improvement since 2015 (Q2 2015: $11 million loss)
    • Consolidation removed fixed costs
    • CMA sold APL container terminals, raised $1 billion
    • 2016: Hanjin bankruptcy removed capacity, creditors got 2 cents on dollar
    • 2017: Economy boomed, massive rebound

Strategic Analysis and Conclusion

  • Taiwan's Evergreen (started same time as NOL) ordered 11 boats 2015 ($130 million each)
  • Evergreen had profitable domestic market, electronics exports, diversified lines (EVA Air)
  • NOL would need billions in government investment to compete
  • 2015: Government realized NOL less strategically important
    • 1960s-70s: Needed own shipping line for manufacturing exports
    • 2015: Economy shifted to services, life sciences, high-tech manufacturing
    • Securing shipping capacity much easier than before
  • Temasek owns companies in priority industries: DBS Group, SingTel, Singapore Airlines
  • Decision would have been made even if NOL briefly profitable - knew it couldn't compete long-term

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