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Why Russia Can’t Replace TSMC

Asianometry

16m 6s

TSMC Sanctions and Industry Impact (February 2022)

  • TSMC halted shipments to Russia per new sanctions
  • Ended shipments from fabless companies: Baikal, MCST, Yadro, STC Module
  • Intel and AMD also stopped Russian shipments
  • Russia forced to rely on domestic semiconductor capacity falling further behind

Soviet Historical Context

  • Soviet Union suffered massive technology gap with US dating to 1960s
  • At 1991 collapse: combined computing power of all Soviet computers = 2 generations behind single American Cray supercomputer
  • Russia inherited 96% of vacuum electronics production facilities
  • Most advanced semiconductor facilities remained in East Germany, Belarus, Ukraine
  • Post-collapse industrial policy pivoted away from domestic electronics, increased import dependence

Current Russian Semiconductor Imports

  • Russia remains net importer of integrated circuits
  • 2020 imports primarily from: Malaysia, China, Vietnam, Taiwan (per Comtrade data)
  • 2014 Crimea sanctions convinced government to develop homegrown chips
  • Import substitution scheme led to Elbrus 2SM development

Micron Group - Russia's Largest Domestic Manufacturer

Company Background

  • Founded 1964 as Research Institute for Molecular Electronics
  • First in country to successfully produce integrated circuit
  • 1970s-80s: produced microprocessors for air defense, Venus space programs
  • Part of "big three" IC manufacturers with Angstrom (Russia) and Integral (Belarus)
  • Converted to joint stock company in 1990s

Current Operations

  • Employs ~1,500 people, 400+ domestic customers, 100+ overseas customers
  • Customers include: top cell carriers, transport companies, banks, government agencies
  • Sales offices in Japan, China, Germany
  • Specializes in RFID: 30 million banking cards, biometric passports, transport cards annually
  • Fabbed chips for Russia's Mir domestic payment system, Moscow transport network

Financial Performance

  • 2019 revenue: $195 million USD (60 rubles/dollar)
  • 2020 revenue: $260 million USD (bolstered by Moscow government subsidies)
  • Net loss in 2015
  • 54% of country's exported technology hardware products
  • 500 million chips produced annually

Manufacturing Capabilities

  • Leningrad fab produces 100mm, 150mm, 200mm wafers
  • 200mm line most sophisticated
  • 2007: technology transfer deal with ST Microelectronics for 180nm process
  • 2010: expanded to 90nm node
  • 2012: 90nm production launched, cost 16.5 billion rubles ($590 million)
  • Jointly financed by RussNano government fund
  • 90nm node reached commercial production 2013 (9 years behind leading edge)

65nm Node Challenges

  • 2014: announced 65nm node achievement at 500 200mm wafers/month
  • Headlines claimed "proof of Russian technology independence"
  • Announcement premature - more science experiment than shipping product
  • Without better lithography scanners (imported from West/Japan), 65nm not commercially viable
  • Website claims 65nm capability but adds asterisk: "under development, production qualification, implementation"
  • Gap with leading edge grew from 9 years to 15+ years (Fujitsu/Toshiba/TSMC shipped 65nm in 2005)

Management Changes and Expansion Plans

  • 2016: replaced management team with Gulnara Kazyanova
  • Announced investment in factory expansion for more chip types, LEDs
  • Target: 30 billion rubles revenue by 2020
  • Included 28nm capable factory in 2018 (little recent progress)
  • Missed 2020 target by 15 billion rubles

Citronix - Micron Sister Company

  • 2007: applied for subsidy to develop 65nm/45nm fab on 300mm wafers
  • Proposed cost: $2.3 billion (vs $1.2 billion total 2012 revenues)
  • Production scheduled 2009, never materialized due to capital intensity
  • No technology partners
  • Current website shows servers, software, smart watches - no chips

Angstrom - Second Major Fab

Company Background

  • Founded 1963 as Research Institute of Precision Technology
  • Headquartered in Zelenograd with Micron
  • Developed/produced NTS-8010 - Soviet Union's first completely domestic computer

Current Operations

  • Offers 130nm and 90nm process nodes on 200mm wafers
  • Capacity: 180,000 wafers/year (vs TSMC gigafab: equivalent monthly)
  • Small scale contributed to bankruptcy 2018-2019

Financial Troubles and Acquisition

  • 2008: borrowed ~$1 billion from state development bank VEB
  • Purchased old 110nm/130nm equipment from AMD
  • Plan: produce 90nm smart card microchips by 2010, upgrade to 65nm
  • Failed timeline: chips didn't roll off line until 2016
  • 65nm process still unavailable
  • Hit by US sanctions due to military/nuclear industry involvement
  • Prevented export business development
  • Debt pushed company into insolvency
  • 2021: VEB subsidiary NM Tech purchased assets for 8.4 billion rubles
  • 10-year plan to become pure-play foundry, target 10nm production

Russian Chip Design Companies

Elbrus Microprocessors (Moscow Center of Spark Technologies)

  • Elbrus 2SM: first completely Russian microprocessor (2014)
  • Declared 2014's #1 technology achievement by local media
  • 90nm processor more for PR than real use
  • Originally made on TSMC 90nm node (performed better than Micron version)
  • Latest: Elbrus 8CB on 28nm process

Baikal Electronics

  • Uses modern practices, EDA tools like Synopsis
  • ARM-based chip development
  • Latest: Baikal M series - 8-core SoC on TSMC 28nm process
  • RISC-V version in development
  • November 2020: planned 200,000+ pieces from TSMC Q1 2021
  • Issues getting fab capacity due to automotive chip shortages
  • June 2021: acquired by Vartan Group (makes AstraLinux domestic OS)
  • Plan: invest 23 billion rubles for server space, 6nm chip development
  • Target: 500,000+ Baikal chips to government organizations

Alternative Foundry Options

Belarus - Integral

  • Third of Soviet "big three" manufacturers (founded 1962)
  • Most sophisticated node: 350nm process (first hit market 1993, used in Nintendo 64)
  • Not viable alternative to TSMC 28nm

China - SMIC

  • Shanghai-based, most advanced node: 14nm process
  • Rumored very good yields, small part of overall business
  • Strong 2021 performance, investing $9 billion in new fab
  • Potential replacement given warm Russia-China relations
  • Limitation: heavily relies on equipment imports from Netherlands, Japan

Long-term Industry Impact

Short-term Minimal Impact

  • Russia has large stockpiles, contingency plans
  • Military applications don't need 7nm chips

Long-term Competitive Disadvantage

  • Further behind competitors in digitization/modernization
  • Russia has 23x fewer industrial robots per 10,000 employees than world average
  • CNC machine share: 10% vs industry standard
  • Only 1% of sensor-generated data utilized
  • Sanctions make it harder for businesses and employees to make progress

Historical Parallel

  • Late Soviet period: Communist Party's inability to close technology gap contributed to confidence loss
  • Similar dynamics potentially at play today

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