AI summary by TwinMind
Why Russia Can’t Replace TSMC
Asianometry
16m 6s
TSMC Sanctions and Industry Impact (February 2022)
- TSMC halted shipments to Russia per new sanctions
- Ended shipments from fabless companies: Baikal, MCST, Yadro, STC Module
- Intel and AMD also stopped Russian shipments
- Russia forced to rely on domestic semiconductor capacity falling further behind
Soviet Historical Context
- Soviet Union suffered massive technology gap with US dating to 1960s
- At 1991 collapse: combined computing power of all Soviet computers = 2 generations behind single American Cray supercomputer
- Russia inherited 96% of vacuum electronics production facilities
- Most advanced semiconductor facilities remained in East Germany, Belarus, Ukraine
- Post-collapse industrial policy pivoted away from domestic electronics, increased import dependence
Current Russian Semiconductor Imports
- Russia remains net importer of integrated circuits
- 2020 imports primarily from: Malaysia, China, Vietnam, Taiwan (per Comtrade data)
- 2014 Crimea sanctions convinced government to develop homegrown chips
- Import substitution scheme led to Elbrus 2SM development
Micron Group - Russia's Largest Domestic Manufacturer
Company Background
- Founded 1964 as Research Institute for Molecular Electronics
- First in country to successfully produce integrated circuit
- 1970s-80s: produced microprocessors for air defense, Venus space programs
- Part of "big three" IC manufacturers with Angstrom (Russia) and Integral (Belarus)
- Converted to joint stock company in 1990s
Current Operations
- Employs ~1,500 people, 400+ domestic customers, 100+ overseas customers
- Customers include: top cell carriers, transport companies, banks, government agencies
- Sales offices in Japan, China, Germany
- Specializes in RFID: 30 million banking cards, biometric passports, transport cards annually
- Fabbed chips for Russia's Mir domestic payment system, Moscow transport network
Financial Performance
- 2019 revenue: $195 million USD (60 rubles/dollar)
- 2020 revenue: $260 million USD (bolstered by Moscow government subsidies)
- Net loss in 2015
- 54% of country's exported technology hardware products
- 500 million chips produced annually
Manufacturing Capabilities
- Leningrad fab produces 100mm, 150mm, 200mm wafers
- 200mm line most sophisticated
- 2007: technology transfer deal with ST Microelectronics for 180nm process
- 2010: expanded to 90nm node
- 2012: 90nm production launched, cost 16.5 billion rubles ($590 million)
- Jointly financed by RussNano government fund
- 90nm node reached commercial production 2013 (9 years behind leading edge)
65nm Node Challenges
- 2014: announced 65nm node achievement at 500 200mm wafers/month
- Headlines claimed "proof of Russian technology independence"
- Announcement premature - more science experiment than shipping product
- Without better lithography scanners (imported from West/Japan), 65nm not commercially viable
- Website claims 65nm capability but adds asterisk: "under development, production qualification, implementation"
- Gap with leading edge grew from 9 years to 15+ years (Fujitsu/Toshiba/TSMC shipped 65nm in 2005)
Management Changes and Expansion Plans
- 2016: replaced management team with Gulnara Kazyanova
- Announced investment in factory expansion for more chip types, LEDs
- Target: 30 billion rubles revenue by 2020
- Included 28nm capable factory in 2018 (little recent progress)
- Missed 2020 target by 15 billion rubles
Citronix - Micron Sister Company
- 2007: applied for subsidy to develop 65nm/45nm fab on 300mm wafers
- Proposed cost: $2.3 billion (vs $1.2 billion total 2012 revenues)
- Production scheduled 2009, never materialized due to capital intensity
- No technology partners
- Current website shows servers, software, smart watches - no chips
Angstrom - Second Major Fab
Company Background
- Founded 1963 as Research Institute of Precision Technology
- Headquartered in Zelenograd with Micron
- Developed/produced NTS-8010 - Soviet Union's first completely domestic computer
Current Operations
- Offers 130nm and 90nm process nodes on 200mm wafers
- Capacity: 180,000 wafers/year (vs TSMC gigafab: equivalent monthly)
- Small scale contributed to bankruptcy 2018-2019
Financial Troubles and Acquisition
- 2008: borrowed ~$1 billion from state development bank VEB
- Purchased old 110nm/130nm equipment from AMD
- Plan: produce 90nm smart card microchips by 2010, upgrade to 65nm
- Failed timeline: chips didn't roll off line until 2016
- 65nm process still unavailable
- Hit by US sanctions due to military/nuclear industry involvement
- Prevented export business development
- Debt pushed company into insolvency
- 2021: VEB subsidiary NM Tech purchased assets for 8.4 billion rubles
- 10-year plan to become pure-play foundry, target 10nm production
Russian Chip Design Companies
Elbrus Microprocessors (Moscow Center of Spark Technologies)
- Elbrus 2SM: first completely Russian microprocessor (2014)
- Declared 2014's #1 technology achievement by local media
- 90nm processor more for PR than real use
- Originally made on TSMC 90nm node (performed better than Micron version)
- Latest: Elbrus 8CB on 28nm process
Baikal Electronics
- Uses modern practices, EDA tools like Synopsis
- ARM-based chip development
- Latest: Baikal M series - 8-core SoC on TSMC 28nm process
- RISC-V version in development
- November 2020: planned 200,000+ pieces from TSMC Q1 2021
- Issues getting fab capacity due to automotive chip shortages
- June 2021: acquired by Vartan Group (makes AstraLinux domestic OS)
- Plan: invest 23 billion rubles for server space, 6nm chip development
- Target: 500,000+ Baikal chips to government organizations
Alternative Foundry Options
Belarus - Integral
- Third of Soviet "big three" manufacturers (founded 1962)
- Most sophisticated node: 350nm process (first hit market 1993, used in Nintendo 64)
- Not viable alternative to TSMC 28nm
China - SMIC
- Shanghai-based, most advanced node: 14nm process
- Rumored very good yields, small part of overall business
- Strong 2021 performance, investing $9 billion in new fab
- Potential replacement given warm Russia-China relations
- Limitation: heavily relies on equipment imports from Netherlands, Japan
Long-term Industry Impact
Short-term Minimal Impact
- Russia has large stockpiles, contingency plans
- Military applications don't need 7nm chips
Long-term Competitive Disadvantage
- Further behind competitors in digitization/modernization
- Russia has 23x fewer industrial robots per 10,000 employees than world average
- CNC machine share: 10% vs industry standard
- Only 1% of sensor-generated data utilized
- Sanctions make it harder for businesses and employees to make progress
Historical Parallel
- Late Soviet period: Communist Party's inability to close technology gap contributed to confidence loss
- Similar dynamics potentially at play today
